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INTRODUCTION
The year 1881 is memorialized in nearly every Turk’s mind,
as the year when the story of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk began.1 His
life and accomplishments as the “immortal leader” of the
Turkish army and as the founder and first President of the
Turkish Republic are imprinted in every Turk’s mind.2 Turkish
*J.D. Candidate, 2012, Fordham University School of Law; B.A. Economics, Middle
Eastern and Islamic Studies, 2009, New York University. The author is of Turkish origin
and has lived in Istanbul, Turkey for over two decades. She would like to thank her
parents and her grandfather for encouraging her to pursue a legal education and her
dear friend Sera N. Önalan for her support and assistance.
1. See Mustafa Kemal Atatürk—His Life, ATATURK.COM, http://www.ataturk.com/
index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=13&Itemid=31 (last visited Feb. 9,
2011) (summarizing the life of Atatürk, the founder of the Turkish Republic, including
his birth year, birth place, and information about his family members); see Soner
Çağaptay, Editorial, Erdogan’s Turn to Reshape Turkey, WASH. POST, Aug. 15, 2011, at A17
(arguing that Atatürk is turned into a cult.).
2. See İlköğretim Ve Ortaöğretim Kurumlarinda Atatürk İnkilap Ve İlkelerinin
Öğretim Esasları Yönergesi, Tebliğler Dergisi, No: 2104, 1981–82 Academic Years
(providing a guideline for teaching standards required by the Ministry of Education for
primary and secondary education classes including history courses, where an emphasis
is to be made on the superiority of Atatürk’s personality as well as his reforms); see also
Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Anayasası [Constitution] Nov. 7, 1982, pmbl. (Turk.). An English
translation is available at http://www.anayasa.gen.tr/1982Constitution-1995-1.pdf.
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children are exposed to books filled with detailed descriptions
and pictures of Atatürk’s life beginning in the first grade.3 These
lessons are interwoven with the study of Turkish history,
democracy, and nationalism.4 As a result, the Turkish identity, as
established by Atatürk, is deeply ingrained throughout society,
particularly in the lives of males, who have to complete
mandatory military service.5 During the eighteen months they
serve in the military, young Turkish men are exposed to the
principle that the Turkish Armed Forces are the ultimate
defenders of Turkish democracy.6
And, there is a strong tradition of military involvement in
Turkish politics.7 In the past eighty-eight years, the Turkish
Armed Forces, as the “guardian” of the secular republic, have
3. See TALİM VE TERBİYE KURULU BAŞKANLIĞI, İLKÖĞRETIM 1–5. SINIF
PROGRAMLARI TANITIM EL KİTABI 28 (2005) (summarizing the topics covered in
Turkish classes from first to fifth grade, including information about Atatürk’s family,
education, military service, political activism, and personality, as well as his public
reforms and revolutions). See generally İsmail H. Demircioğlu, Does the Teaching of History
in Turkey Need Reform?, 2 INT’L. J. HIST. LEARNING, TEACHING & RES. 1, 2–3 (Dec. 2001),
http://www.heirnet.org/IJHLTR/journal3/turkey.pdf (noting the views of some
scholars that education in Turkey is dominated by nationalist views, always depicting
Turks as “powerful and all-conquering”).
4. See Demircioğlu, supra note 3, at 2 (describing the dominance of nationalist
views in Turkish education); see also The Turkish Educational System, THE TURKISH
FULBRIGHT
COMMISSION,
http://www.fulbright.org.tr/en/about-turkey/turkisheducational-system (last visited Aug. 16, 2011) (stating that basic education in Turkey
includes the history of the Turkish Republic and Atatürk’s reforms).
5. See Directorate for Movements of Persons, Migration and Consular Affairs,
Asylum and Migration Div., U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Turkey/Military Service,
9–11 (July 2001), http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/467010bd2.pdf (discussing
relevant legislation to military service in Turkey and noting that the Turkish armed
forces regard themselves as guardians of Atatürk’s principles). See generally Law No.
1111 of June 21, 1927, art. 1, Resmi Gazete [R.G.] No. 631-635 (July 17, 1927) (Turk.)
(providing that “every male Turkish citizen is obliged to perform his military service in
accordance with this law”).
6. See Directorate for Movements of Persons, Migration and Consular Affairs,
Asylum and Migration Division, supra note 5, at 11 (observing that the Turkish armed
forces regard themselves as “guardians” of Atatürk’s principles); see also Çağrı Yıldırım,
The Role of the Military in Turkish Politics and European Union Membership Negotiations,
BALKANALYSIS.COM (Dec. 2, 2010), http://www.balkanalysis.com/turkey/2010/12/02/
the-role-of-the-military-in-turkish-politics-and-european-union-membershipnegotiations/ (noting that the duty of the Turkish armed forces is to protect the
Turkish territory and republic as stipulated by the constitution and that this duty has
justified three military interventions).
7. See Yıldırım, supra note 6 (discussing military involvement in Turkish politics
since Ottoman times); see also infra Part I.B (analyzing the role of military in Turkish
politics).
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taken over the government three times, intervening until a new
round of civilian elections could be held.8 The last of these three
coups d’état took place on September 12, 1980, leaving Turkey
with an authoritarian constitution that has been in effect since
1982 (“1982 Constitution”).9
Although modified several times in the last three decades,
specifically within the framework of European Union (“EU”)
reforms, the 1982 Constitution has allowed the military to
remain highly influential in Turkish politics.10 The most
significant reforms took place in 2010, when the ruling Justice
and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (“AKP”)),
affiliated with Islamist political ideology, announced a
constitutional reform package (“Package”), aimed at
democratizing the 1982 Constitution.11 Due to the Islamist
ideological background of many AKP members, the Package
caused turmoil among some citizens who perceived the proposal
as a threat to Atatürk’s secular democracy, and they demanded

8. See Yıldırım, supra note 6 (noting that the military is the “guardian” of the
secular republic and has intervened by taking over the government three times). See,
e.g., infra note 75 and accompanying text (giving the example of the 1983 elections,
until which the military exercised power in politics).
9. See Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Anayasası Nov. 7, 1982 (Turk.); Pelin Turgut, Turkey
Braces for Key Vote over Its Future, TIME (Sept. 11, 2010), http://www.time.com/time/
world/article/0,8599,2017448,00.html (“The current [constitution] is an authoritarian
holdover from a 1980 coup, drafted by generals and designed to enshrine the power of
the state over the individual.”); see also Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of State, Background
Notes: Turkey (Mar. 12, 2010) (listing the passage date of the current Turkish
constitution (“1982 Constitution”) and the years it has subsequently been amended);
Metin Heper, Consolidating Turkish Democracy, J. DEMOCRACY 105, 105 (1992) (listing
the three military interventions in 1960, 1971, and 1980).
10. See MEHMET FEVZİ BİLGİN, CONSTITUTION, LEGITIMACY AND DEMOCRACY IN
TURKEY, 135, 142 (Said Amir Arjomand ed., 2008) (noting that the 1982 Constitution
has been modified numerous times and that the military is influential in Turkish
politics); see also Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Anayasasi Nov. 7, 1982 (Turk.) (amended 2010).
A version of the Constitution of the Republic of Turkey, as amended since 1982, is
available at http://www.anayasa.gen.tr/1982ay.htm.
11. See SELIN M. BÖLME & TAHA ÖZHAN, SETA FOUNDATION FOR POLITICAL,
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RESEARCH, BRIEF NO: 47, POLICY BRIEF: CONSTITUTIONAL
REFERENDUM IN TURKEY 2, 3–8 (Aug. 2010), available at http://www.setav.org/Ups/
dosya/44512.pdf [hereinafter POLICY BRIEF] (discussing the Adalet ve Kalkınma
Partisi’s (“AKP”) announcement in March 2010 of a constitutional amendment
package (“Package”) aimed at democratizing Turkey’s constitution); see also infra notes
94–97 (providing the relationship between former Islamist parties, such as the Refah
Partisi (“RP”), the Fazilet Partisi (“FP”), and the AKP).
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Turkish military intervention.12 Despite the ideological turmoil,
the Turkish public voted to amend the Constitution on
September 12, 2010—exactly thirty years after the military
intervention, which resulted in the creation of that very
document.13
This Comment questions whether the Package promotes a
civil and more democratic constitution by weakening the
military’s role in politics or whether the Package actually
promotes a so-called hidden Islamist agenda advocated by the
AKP, threatening Atatürk’s modern secular Turkey.14 Part I of
this Comment examines the unique geographical and social
position of Turkey as part of both Europe and the Middle East,
summarizes key events in modern Turkish history, and examines
the importance of the military in Turkish politics. Part II
introduces the language of the Package and the referendum
process. Part III analyzes the amendments considered at the
national referendum and predicts their legal effects with regard
to Turkey’s EU candidacy and the balance of power among
domestic institutions. This Comment concludes that, although
the revisions to the Constitution were welcomed as a move
toward a more modern and democratic state, the selective
nature of the Package and the Islamist roots of some AKP
politicians raise questions about the true motivation of these
reforms.

12. See infra note 130 and accompanying text (noting that a segment of the
Turkish population regards the AKP’s efforts to amend the Constitution as a threat to
secular democracy).
13. See Christopher Torchia, Turks Vote for Constitutional Amendments: Approval
Viewed as Boost Towards Bid to Join EU, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 13, 2010, at 6 (reporting
Turkish approval of the Package); see also Sebnem Arsu & Dan Bilefsky, Turkish
Constitutional Changes Pass by a Wide Margin, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 2010, at A4 (reporting
the results of the constitutional referendum that fell on the thirtieth anniversary of the
military coup that sanctioned the 1982 Constitution); Turkey Vote Boosts PM Future, AL
JAZEERA (Sept. 13, 2010), http://english.aljazeera.net/video/europe/2010/09/
201091375453805603.html (“With nearly 80 percent turnout, poll results show that 58
percent voted in favour of the referendum.”).
14. See infra notes 130, 225 and accompanying text (describing the segments in
Turkish society that suspect a hidden Islamist agenda behind the AKP’s policies); cf.
infra note 230 (noting the view that regards the Package as an effort to democratize
Turkish politics).
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I. BACKGROUND: SUMMARY OF TURKISH HISTORY AND
POLITICS, 1923–PRESENT
This Part explores the history of the Turkish Republic beginning
with its founding in 1923. Sections A and B discuss the
importance of Turkey’s location and history as well as their
impact on Turkish politics and society. These subsections focus
on the role of religion and the military. Section C presents a
brief account of Turkish politics after the introduction of the
multi-party regime and the three subsequent military coups
d’état that occurred in the following four decades. Section D
examines the historical context of the 1982 Constitution, which
the Package aims to revise. Sections E and F discuss the balance
between the military and political parties in the last decade,
including the AKP, currently the ruling party in Turkey, and its
forerunner the Welfare Party. Section G summarizes the EU
application process under the AKP governments and reviews
recent reforms and achievements.
A. Turkey: A Country on Two Continents
Modern Turkey is a Eurasian country that encompasses vast
territory across the Anatolian Peninsula in southwestern Asia
and in southeastern Europe.15 Turkey cannot be called either
wholly European or Middle Eastern.16 It is a bridge between the
West and the East, at a crossroads where the two cultures meet
and interact.17 Nevertheless, along with Turkey’s unique and
15. See The World Factbook: Turkey, CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY,
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/tu.html
(last
visited Sept. 15, 2011) (specifying Turkey’s geographic location); see also Turkey Country
Profile, BBC NEWS, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/country_profiles/1022222.stm
(last visited Sept. 15, 2011) (giving an overview of Turkey, including the “strategically
important” location of the country).
16. See, e.g., Owen Matthews, Eastern Star: Turkey’s Prime Minister Has Become a Hero
in the Middle East for Standing Up to the West. But Islam Isn’t What’s Driving Him,
NEWSWEEK, Sept. 20, 2010, at 44 (observing that in recent years, Turkey has been
moving eastwards); see Susanna Dokupil, The Separation of Mosque and State: Islam and
Democracy in Modern Turkey, 105 W. VA. L. REV. 53, 60 (2002) (comparing Turkey to
Janus, with two faces in opposite directions, in this case the East and the West).
17. See David J. Gottlieb et al., Conference on Comparative Law—Recent Developments
in European, American, and Turkish Law: “Team Kansas” Goes to Turkey, 45 U. KAN. L. REV.
671, 703 (1997) (“Turkey is where Western and Eastern cultures meet [and]
interact.”); see also Ahmet Davutoğlu, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Turk.,
The US-Turkey Relationship, Address before the Council on Foreign Relations (Apr.
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strategic location comes specific domestic and international
geopolitical challenges.18 Since its founding in 1923, Turkey has
experienced constant tensions between its secular-Western and
conservative-Islamist citizens, manifested in violent clashes
between these two ideological groups.19 These tensions have led
to: student protests at universities; mass arrests of journalists,
politicians, and academics for political affiliation; and numerous
unsolved murders.20 The basic tension between the Westernleaning, nationalist-secular Turks and the Eastern-leaning,
conservative-Islamist Turks arises from the assumption that Islam
and democracy are incompatible.21 In the case of Turkey, while
ninety-nine percent of the population is Muslim, Article 2 of the
1982 Constitution states that the country is a democratic,
secular, and social state, governed by the rule of law.22 In fact,
Turkey is the only democracy with a Western-secularist legal
14, 2010) in FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE, Apr. 14, 2010, (emphasizing Turkey’s
multidimensional, geopolitical characteristic stemming from being “right at the center
of Afro-Euro-Asia”).
18. See infra notes 19–21 and accompanying text (discussing the conflicts among
different cultural and ideological groups, as one of the major social challenges facing
Turkey).
19. See Dokupil, supra note 16, at 80, 91 (exemplifying the governments’ inability
to control civil disorder right before the 1971 and 1980 military interventions); see also
Murat Somer, Moderate Islam and Secularist Opposition in Turkey: Implications for the World,
Muslims and Secular Democracy, 28 THIRD WORLD Q. 1271, 1274 (2007) (describing the
rivalry between secular-nationalists and Islamic-conservatives).
20. See SİNA AKŞİN, KISA TÜRKİYE TARİHİ [A BRIEF HISTORY OF TURKEY] 271–72
(2007) (discussing the social chaos and violence on the streets of Turkey prior to the
1980 coup); see also Ali Necati Doğan, 12 Eylül Darbesi, Öncesi Olaylar, Gerekçeleri ve
Sonuç, MILLIYET BLOG (Sept. 13, 2009), http://blog.milliyet.com.tr/Blog.aspx?
BlogNo=202714 (discussing events, reasons and results of the 1980 Coup including the
list of unresolved political murders).
21. See, e.g., Padideh Ala’i, Turkey: At the Crossroads of Secular West and Traditional
East, 24 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 679, 681 (2009) (stating that the historian Feroz Ahmad
maintains that Kemalists were not against Islam and that contemporary Turkish society
is not in danger of becoming another Iran); see Ian Ward, The Culture of Enlargement, 12
COLUM. J. EUR. L. 199, 220 (indicating that the original Kemalist construction of
modern Turkey “assumed a natural dichotomy between secularism and Islam,” holding
democracy and Islam incompatible).
22. See Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Anayasasi Nov. 7, 1982, art. 2 (Turk.) (“Türkiye
Cumhuriyeti . . . Atatürk Milliyetçiliğine bağlı, başlangıçta belirtilen temel ilkelere
dayanan, demokratik, laik ve sosyal bir hukuk Devletidir.”); Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of
State, supra note 9 (“The 1982 Constitution . . . proclaims Turkey’s system of
government as democratic, secular, and parliamentary.”); see also Press Release, U.S.
Dep’t of State, supra note 9 (noting that Turkey’s population is ninety-nine percent
Muslim).
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framework adapted to an Islamic society.23 Turkey is a Muslim
country considered to be not as Islamic as most of its eastern
neighbors, but it is also a democracy considered to be not as
European as its Western neighbors.24 This diversity prompts
questions regarding religion’s role in society and politics, a
subject that has dominated the Turkish public discourse since its
founding.25
B. The Role of Religion and the Military in Turkish Politics and Society
Secularism in Turkey has been largely supported by the
Western-educated elite, who also compose the most influential
segments of society, including the business and political circles.26
They, along with the military and the judiciary, form the secular
nationalist stronghold of Turkish society.27 This select group of
people resides primarily in Istanbul and Ankara, standing in
great contrast to the often-less-educated citizens who reside in
smaller cities and villages in Anatolia and who have been
repeatedly excluded from economic and political arenas.28 The
23. See Dokupil, supra note 16, at 55 (differentiating Turkey as the only secular
Muslim state that is challenged by its incorporation of secularism and democracy in an
Islamic society); see also History of Turkey—EU Relations, MINISTRY FOR EU AFFAIRS,
REPULBIC OF TURK., available at http://www.abgs.gov.tr/index.php?p=111&I=2 (last
updated Apr. 6, 2007) (“Turkey is the only pluralist secular democracy in the Moslem
world . . . .”).
24. See Ward, supra note 21, at 217–18 (distinguishing Turkey as a country that is
not as Islamic as other Muslim countries, but still too Islamic to be accepted by the
EU); Davutoğlu, supra note 17, (providing the views of the Turkish Minister of Foreign
Affairs, Ahmet Davutoglu, on the unique geographical continuity of Turkey).
25. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of State, supra note 9 (enumerating religion’s
role in Turkish society and government as one of the issues dominating public
discourse). See generally Dokupil, supra note 16, at 55 (analyzing the role of Islam in
Turkish politics).
26. See Dokupil, supra note 16, at 55 (indicating that Western democracy in
Turkey is strongly advocated by educated elites and the military); see also Ward, supra
note 21, at 218 (distinguishing the privileged status of the Western-educated elite in
Turkish society and their views on secularism).
27. See, e.g., Ibon Villelabeitia, Referendum Reveals Three Faces of Turkey, CYPRUS
MAIL, Sept. 15, 2010 (revealing that Turkey’s secular establishment opposed the
constitutional amendments); see Dokupil, supra note 16, at 55 (noting the support by
the educated elite and the military for a Western-style democracy).
28. See Ahmet İnsel, The AKP and Normalizing Democracy in Turkey, 102 S. ATLANTIC
Q. 293, 297, 306 (2003) (pointing to the discrepancy between the secular urban elite
and the less-educated masses); Dokupil, supra note 16, at 55 (stating that Islamist
policies “resonate[] with the agricultural workers, small shopkeepers, and low-skilled
laborers,” and describing the contrast between the urban elite and the rural masses);
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exclusion of certain citizens from political power and the
tension between the educated elite and the rural populations
are two significant factors leading to the polarization between
those who envision an Islamic Turkey and those who hope for a
European Turkey.29
The origins of military influence in Turkish politics precede
even the founding of the Turkish Republic.30 Every Turkish
constitution since 1921 has charged the military with protecting
the state and has given the military the right and duty to
intervene in the “name of the nation.”31 As such, the military has
been seen as an important component of Turkey’s checks-andbalances system.32
Turkey’s constitution establishes a separation of powers as
follows: the executive power belongs to the President and the
Council of Ministers; the legislative power belongs to the
Parliament—Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi (“TBMM”), and the
judiciary power belongs to the courts, with the Constitutional

see also Villelabeitia, supra note 27 (“Since its establishment as a secular state in 1921
Turkey has been traditionally rules by a Westernised elite in Istanbul and Ankara. The
Anatolian masses were economically and politically excluded . . . .”).
29. See, e.g., İnsel, supra note 28, at 306 (noting that the polarization in Turkey is
between the republican elites and the rest of the population); see Ward, supra note 21,
at 225 (employing the terms “Islamic Turkey” and “European Turkey” to describe the
differing perspectives between conflicting factions in Turkey).
30. See David Capezza, The Military in Politics: Turkey’s Military is a Catalyst for
Reform, MIDDLE E. Q., Summer 2009, at 13 (“The military has deep roots in society, and
its influence predates the founding of the republic.”); Yıldırım, supra note 6 (noting
that the military’s involvement in politics began in Ottoman times and that it was the
military who initiated the new republic’s political modernization process).
31. Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Anayasası Nov. 7, 1982, art. 117 (Turk.); see Law No. 211
of Jan. 4, 1961, Resmi Gazete [R.G.] No. 10703 (Jan. 10, 1961) (Turk.) (“Silahlı
Kuvvetlerin vazifesi; Türk yurdunu ve Anayasa ile tayin edilmiş olan Türkiye
Cumhuriyetini kollamak ve korumaktır.”) Dinesh D. Banani, Reforming History: Turkey’s
Legal Regime and Its Potential Accession to the European Union, 26 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L.
REV. 113, 115 (2003) (quoting Paul J. Magnarella, The Legal, Political and Cultural
Structures of Human Rights Protections and Abuses in Turkey, 3 INT’L L. & PRAC. 439, 448
(1994)) (noting that the Constitution gives “the military the right and duty to intervene
in Turkish politics in the ‘name of the nation’”); see Capezza, supra note 30, at 13
(emphasizing that from Turkey’s founding, the military has assumed the role of
guarantors of the Constitution).
32. See Capezza, supra note 30, at 13 (indicating that the Turkish military remains
an important component of the checks-and-balances system); c.f. Arsu & Bilefsky, supra
note 13, at A5 (quoting a Turkish columnist who fears the package of constitutional
reforms passed in September 2010 would leave a system lacking checks and balances).
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Court acting as the highest court responsible for judicial
review.33
Within this structure, the military guarantees and supervises
secular democracy.34 To better understand the role of the
military in Turkey today, it is useful to become familiar with the
Ottoman-Turkish constitutional history and the founding
principles of modern Turkey, as created by Atatürk.
Turkish dynasties controlled Muslim territories in Central
Asia, the Middle East, and Anatolia from the eleventh century
until the founding of the Ottoman Empire in 1301.35 The
Ottomans established their empire on “the principle of military
conquest infused with religious fervor” and relied on a legal
system based on the principles of Sharia—Islamic Law.36 After
the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in World War I, a
revolutionary political force, led by General Mustafa Kemal
(later named Atatürk, “father of the Turks”), and independent
from the Ottoman Empire’s political elite, emerged in eastern
Anatolia.37 With the support of Anatolian Turks, these
revolutionaries fought the Turkish War of Independence and
established the TBMM in 1920.38 While the Turkish army battled
33. See Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Anayasası Nov. 7, 1982, arts. 7–9 (Turk.)
(enumerating the executive, legislative, and judiciary powers of the Turkish
Constitution); see also Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of State, supra note 9, (noting the
separation of powers in Turkey).
34. See Capezza, supra note 30, at 13 (noting the supervisory role of the military);
see, e.g., ERGUN ÖZBUDUN & ÖMER F. GENÇKAYA, DEMOCRATIZATION AND THE POLITICS
OF CONSTITUTION-MAKING IN TURKEY 21 (2009) (asserting that the 1982 Constitution
stipulates the military’s role as the guardian of the state).
35. See Dokupil, supra note 16, at 59 (stating that Ottomans controlled Islamic
territories from the eleventh century to the fourteenth century); see also Ottoman Empire,
BBC RELIGIONS (Sept. 4, 2009), http://www.bbc.co.uk/religion/religions/islam/
history/ottomanempire_1.shtml (describing the origins of the Ottoman Empire).
36. Dokupil, supra note 16, at 56–57, 59 (arguing that the law of the Ottomans was
Sharia, a legal code based on the Qur’an and the Sunna, laws informed by the sayings
and practices of Muhammad, the Prophet); Christian Rumpf, The Importance of
Legislative History Materials in the Interpretation of Statutes in Turkey, 19 N.C. J. INT’L L. &
COM. REG. 267, 269 (1994) (noting that the Ottoman legal system was based on Islamic
law (Sharia)).
37. See Rumpf, supra note 36, at 270 (explaining the creation of a sovereign
Turkish government under Atatürk); see also Dokupil, supra note 16, at 65 (noting
Atatürk’s leadership and the organization of a nationalist movement in central
Turkey).
38. See Dokupil, supra note 16, at 65–66 (summarizing the Republic’s founding
including the creation of the Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi (“TBMM”), the Parliament);
see also Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of State, supra note 9, (noting that Atatürk led the
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Western imperialists, the TBMM abolished the sultanate,
expelled the Sultan, and officially declared the Republic of
Turkey in 1923.39 During the next few years, the TBMM, under
the leadership of Atatürk, transitioned Turkey from a monarchy
into a liberal democracy by realizing reforms such as the
adoption of the Turkish Civil Code, thus ending the rule of
Sharia.40
These liberal reforms reoriented the role of religion by
removing it from the public sphere.41 Turkish society was now
free from traditionally Islamic societal norms; science and
reason formed the infrastructure of Turkey’s new, Western-style
secular civil society.42 The collapse of the Islamic legal tradition

Turkish Republic’s founding after the three-year War of Independence); Dankwart A.
Rustow, Atatürk as Founder of a State, PHILOSOPHERS AND KINGS: STUDIES IN LEADERSHIP,
793, 795–96 (1968) (describing Anatolia as Atatürk’s stronghold and the location from
where he initiated the nationalist movement against the Allies and the Sultan);
Founding of the Turkish Grand National Assembly, TÜRKIYE BÜYÜK MILLET MECLISI,
http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/english/about_tgna.htm#FOUNDING%20OF%20THE%
20TURKISH%20GRAND%20NATIONAL%20ASSEMBLY (last visited Oct. 2, 2011)
(“The Turkish Grand National Assembly, established on national sovereignty, held its
first opening session . . . on 23 April 1920.”).
39. See Dokupil, supra note 16, at 66 (summarizing the events leading to and
following the proclamation of the Republic, including the separation of the sultanate
from the caliphate and the abolishment of the sultan); see also Press Release, U.S. Dep’t
of State, supra note 9 (noting that Atatürk led the founding of the Turkish Republic in
1923).
40. See, e.g., Law No. 671 of Nov. 25, 1925, Resmi Gazete [R.G.] No. 230 (Nov. 28,
1925) (Turk.) (Hat Law of 1925) (restricting the use of religious headgear of citizens,
without permission from the government). An English description of the Hat Law of
1925 is available at http://www.kultur.gov.tr/EN/belge/2-15009/1925.html. See, e.g.,
Law No. 2596 of Dec. 3, 1934 Resmi Gazete [R.G.] No. 2879 (Dec. 13, 1934) (Turk.)
(Clothing Reform of 1934) (prohibiting religious functionaries to appear in religious
clothing outside of their place of worship or during religious services). An English
description of the Clothing Reform of 1934 is available at http://www.kultur.gov.tr/
EN/belge/2-15022/1934.html. See Dokupil, supra note 16, at 68–70 (listing Atatürk’s
reforms including the replacement of Sharia with a European Civil Code).
41. See Dokupil, supra note 16, at 68–69 (analyzing some of Atatürk’s reforms as
changing the relationship between religion and the state and banning vestiges of
religion from the public sphere); see also Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of State, supra note 9
(indicating that the reforms between 1924 and 1934 formed the ideological base of the
republic).
42. See Dokupil, supra note 16, at 70–71 (quoting Ali Kazancigil, Democracy in
Muslim Lands: Turkey in Comparative Perspective, 43 INT’L SOC. SCI. J. 343, 350 (1991))
(describing the newly identified Turkish society as one that is in “a cultural arena no
longer structured by religious faith, but by reason and science” (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
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was a major part of this redefinition.43 Initiated with the newlyadopted Turkish Civil Code, the radical modernization and
westernization of Turkish society was solidified by the
transformation of the legal system from faith-based to secular.44
The Six Arrows of Kemalism, the symbol for the Cumhuriyet
Halk Partisi (“CHP”) [Republican People’s Party] represent the
Western-political values Atatürk intended the new Turkish
republic to embrace: republicanism, nationalism, populism,
reformism, étatism, and secularism.45 Manifested in Atatürk’s
reforms, these six principles constituted the ideological
foundation of modern Turkey.46 The military and the judiciary
in particular, which regard themselves as the guardians of
Kemalism, have often clashed with Islamist political parties that
gained influence throughout the 1960s and reopened the
discourse on Islam’s role in Turkish politics.47 In response to the
increasing popularity of such faith-based political ideologies, the
military, in accordance with its constitutional powers, has
intervened in Turkish politics three times in the past five

43. See Arzu Oğuz, The Role of Comparative Law in the Development of Turkish Civil
Law, 17 PACE INT’L L. REV. 373, 382–85 (2005) (describing how the elimination of
Sharia and adoption of the Swiss Code transformed the Turkish legal system); see also
Dokupil, supra note 16, at 70 (discussing some of the legal reforms initiated by Atatürk
as redefining Turkish society).
44. See Oğuz, supra note 43, at 380, 383 (discussing the adoption of the new civil
code in Turkey, allowing the country’s legal system to transition from a faith-based
Islamic one into a secular-western one); see also supra notes 39–42 and accompanying
text (underlining Atatürk’s objective of creating a new Turkish identity detached from
the old Islamic Ottoman one).
45. See Dokupil, supra note 16, at 65 (identifying the Six Arrows of Kemalism); see
also Ward, supra note 21, at 220 (outlining the six political values encouraged by
Kemalism). CHP was founded by Atatürk and is currently the main opposition party in
the TBMM. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of State, supra note 9 (listing the number of
TBMM members each political party has in the government, with the AKP holding 337
seats and CHP holding ninety-seven seats in 2010).
46. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of State, supra note 9 (noting that the principles
of Kemalism constitute the ideological base of modern Turkey); see also supra note 40
and accompanying text (stating some of the reforms implemented under Atatürk).
47. See Has Turkey’s Referendum Granted More Power to Erdogan?, DAILY TIMES (Pak.)
(Sept. 15, 2010), http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2010\09\15\story_159-2010_pg4_9 (noting that the military and the courts, as guardians of secular Turkey,
have often clashed with current ruling party, the AKP); see also Dokupil, supra note 16,
at 54 (discussing the steady proliferation of Islamist political ideologies since the
1960s).
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decades to restore the founding principles of Kemalism.48 In
order to better understand the present dynamics between
today’s “conservative globalists” and the “defensive nationalists,”
the military coups of 1960, 1971, and 1980, along with their
respective constitutions, are summarized below.49
C. Coups d’État of 1960, 1971, and 1980
Although Turkey remained neutral during most of World
War II, with the implementation of the Truman Doctrine in
1947 and the Marshall Plan in 1948, Turkey strengthened its
political ties with the West, particularly the United States.50 In
the midst of these international developments, and after twentyseven years of single-party rule, President Ismet Inönü initiated
the implementation of a multi-party system in Turkey.51
The newcomer Democratic Party (“DP”) introduced a
religious revival by liberalizing Atatürk’s secularism and
reformulating the Kemalist principles and their application to
Turkish politics.52 The anti-liberal activism against the DP, along

48. See supra note 8 and accompanying text; see also Kivanc Ulusoy, The “Democratic
Opening” in Turkey: A Historical/Comparative Perspective, INSIGHT TURKEY, Apr.–June
2010, at 20 (noting the three coups in 1960, 1971, and 1980); Capezza, supra note 30, at
17–19 (summarizing the military interventions triggered by the rise of Islamist political
parties).
49. See ÖZBUDUN & GENÇKAYA, supra note 34, at 94 (identifying the tension and
rift between the “conservative globalists” and the “defensive nationalists”); see also
Capezza, supra note 30, at 13 (noting the three constitutions of Turkey).
50. See STUART E. EIZENSTAT, ALLIED RELATIONS AND NEGOATIATIONS WITH
TURKEY
1–2,
available
at
http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/rpt_9806_
ng_turkey.pdf (discussing Turkey’s Neutrality in World War II); see also AKŞİN, supra
note 20, at 240 (summarizing events, such as the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan,
and Turkey’s entry into NATO as examples of the strengthening of its international
ties); Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of State, supra note 9 (describing the Truman Doctrine
and the Marshall Plan as US policies supporting Greece and Turkey and other
European countries with economic and military aid to prevent Soviet influence).
51. See AKŞİN, supra note 20, at 240 (stating that President İsmet İnönü believed
that to place Turkey on the same footing as Europe, the political pluralism dominating
Europe at the time had to be enforced in Turkey); see also Irina A. Danilkina, Turkey:
The Party System from 1963 to 2000, INTERNATIONAL COMPARATIVE POLITICAL PARTIES
PROJECT, http://janda.org/ICPP/ICPP2000/Countries/7-MiddleEastNorthAfrica/78Turkey/Turkey63-00.htm (last visited Nov. 3, 2011) (noting that between 1923 and
1946, Atatürk’s Republican People’s Party was the only party in the country).
52. See Dokupil, supra note 16, at 72–76 (describing the Democratic Party’s
(“DP”) ten-year rule between 1950 and 1960); see also AKŞİN, supra note 20, at 245
(explaining that the DP won sixty-six seats in the 465-seated TBMM in 1946).
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with the worsening economy toward the end of the 1950s,
exacerbated the clash between the secularists and Islamists.53 To
restore social and political order, the military intervened on May
27, 1960, which ended with the execution of Prime Minister
Adnan Menderes, along with two other members of the
cabinet.54 Unlike concurrent military interventions in Egypt,
Greece, Iraq, and Syria, where the military refused to hand over
power to the civilians for many years, in Turkey, the military
created the Constituent Assembly, drafted a new constitution,
and restored civilian politics eighteen months after the
takeover.55 The concepts of a social state, political pluralism,
parliamentary bicameralism, and the introduction of democratic
institutions, such as the Constitutional Court, were some of the
developments facilitated by the 1960 coup and the constitution
it produced.56
While the 1961 Constitution expanded civil liberties and
social rights, it also demonstrated the military’s distrust in
political parties.57 The 1961 Constitution institutionalized
53. See AKŞİN, supra note 20, at 260 (citing poor management of the economy as
one of the reasons for the 1960 Coup); see also Capezza, supra note 30, at 17 (“In April
1960, amidst student protests and unrest between the government and the opposition
parties, the military launched a coup . . . .”).
54. See Capezza, supra note 30, at 17 (discussing the arrests and executions of
prominent politicians after the 1960 coup); see also Danilkina, supra note 51 (noting
that the 1960 military coup led to the termination of the DP).
55. See Capezza, supra note 30, at 17 (differentiating between military
interventions in neighboring nations); see also AKŞIN, supra note 20, at 260 (noting the
establishment of the Constituent Assembly by military officials in early 1961);
Danilkina, supra note 51 (describing the 1961 Constitution as one drafted to ensure
liberalism and democracy). The phrase civilian politics refers to officials who are
elected by the people, as opposed to members of the military who may intervene in and
control Turkish politics. For an analysis of the civil-military relations in Turkey, see
ŞULE TOKTAŞ & ÜMIT KURT, SETA FOUND. FOR POLITICAL, ECON. AND SOC. RESEARCH,
BRIEF NO: 26, POLICY BRIEF: THE IMPACT OF EU REFORM PROCESS ON CIVIL-MILITARY
RELATIONS IN TURKEY 1–2 (Nov. 2008), available at http://www.setav.org/ups/dosya/
7460.pdf.
56. See Danilkina, supra note 51 (describing the 1961 Constitution as the most
liberal constitution Turkey ever had); see also Dokupil, supra note 16, at 77
(enumerating the most significant achievements of the 1961 Constitution, including
the guarantee of certain civil liberties, the institution of judicial review by the newly
established Constitutional Court, and the freedoms of religious faith and worship). See
generally Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Anayasası July 20, 1961 (Turk.). An English translation is
available at http://www.anayasa.gen.tr/1961constitution-amended.pdf.
57. See ÖZBUDUN & GENÇKAYA, supra note 34, at 16 (indicating that the 1961
Constitution expanded social and political rights, but also reflected the military’s
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judicial review and the complete independence of the judiciary,
thus creating a checks and balances system in Turkish politics.58
The establishment of an advisory board called the National
Security Council (Milli Güvenlik Kurulu, “MGK”), composed of
ministers and the highest chief officers in the Turkish army,
provided the military a forum to voice its perspective, especially
in matters concerning national security.59 In addition, Article
141 of the 1961 Constitution established the Military Court of
Cassation to review the decisions of military courts and those
involving military officials.60
After the 1960 coup d’etat, a new era began in Turkish
politics.61 This new political period reflected an increase in the
popularity of Islamist political ideologies, which, in opposition
to the socialist and leftist movement, acquired an “anti-liberal,
anti-socialist dimension” and resulted in the polarization of
society between the conservative extreme right and the socialist

distrust in elected civilian politicians); see also Danilkina, supra note 51 (noting that the
1961 Constitution prohibited communist and religious parties and approved
adversarial politics only if compatible with Atatürk’s mandated secular and republican
state).
58. See Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Anayasası July 20, 1961, art. 7 (Turk.) (“Judicial
power shall be exercised by the independent courts on behalf of the Turkish nation.”);
see also İsmet Giritli, Some Aspects of the New Turkish Constitution, MIDDLE E. J., Winter
1962, at 9 (“One of the other fundamental principles embodied in the Constitution is
that judges and courts of law shall be absolutely independent and free from
interference in the performance of their duties.”).
59. See ÖZBUDUN & GENÇKAYA, supra note 34, at 18 (introducing the Milli
Güvenlik Kurulu (“MGK”) or the National Security Council); see also Yıldırım, supra
note 6 (observing that the MGK was established to legitimize the military’s involvement
in politics).
60. See Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Anayasası July 20, 1961, art. 141 (Turk.) (providing
the original language of Article 141 relating to the establishment of Military Court of
Cassation); see also YILMAZ ENSAROĞLU, SETA FOUND. FOR POLITICAL, ECON., AND SOC.
RESEARCH, SETA ANALİZ, İNSAN HAKLARI VE DEMOKRATİKLEŞME BAĞLAMINDA YENİ
ANAYASA PAKETİ [SETA ANALYSIS, THE NEW CONSTITUTIONAL PACKAGE IN THE
CONTEXT OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRATIZATION] 42 (2010), available at
http://www.setav.org/Ups/dosya/45997.pdf (discussing the expansion of the authority
of military justice with each constitution).
61. See Dokupil, supra note 16, at 77 (noting that Kemalist principles were
adhered to in rhetoric but in practice were no longer being interpreted consistently
with Atatürk’s original intent); see also Danilkina, supra note 51 (explaining that the
Communist and the Islamist parties were banned after the coup because they were
considered to be dangerous and did not comport with Atatürk’s secular and republican
state).

294 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 34:279
left.62 Around 1970, this polarization escalated into street
demonstrations, student protests, and economic unrest, all of
which prompted the Turkish military to intervene in politics for
a second time and decree the memorandum of March 12,
1971.63
The Memorandum of 1971 held the government
responsible for not enacting the reforms envisaged by Atatürk
and the Constitution of 1961.64 The government’s failure to
enact these reforms critically affected the military because, as
referenced above, the 1961 Constitution emphasized the
significance of the military in Turkish politics as the
constitutionally-authorized guardian of the secular state.65 While
neither the Constitution of 1924, nor the Constitution of 1961,
specifically endorse coups or give instructions explaining the
circumstances under which the military should intervene,
military intervention in politics has generally been supported
throughout modern Turkish history by the public, who
inherently distrust politicians.66 Following the 1971 Coup,
62. See Dokupil, supra note 16, at 77–79 (describing the political developments
and the social polarization between 1961 and 1970); see also Aira Chtena, The Military in
Modern Turkey: A Lasting Political Force, J. STUDY PEACE & CONFLICT, 1998–99, available at
http://jspc.library.wisc.edu/issues/1998-1999/article5.html, (noting that the 1971
coup took place because the government had failed to assuage the conflict between the
Marxist and ultra-right forces).
63. See AKŞİN, supra note 20, at 267–68 (describing the social and economic unrest
in Turkey which led to the military memorandum and stating that the Memorandum of
March 12th held the President and the Prime Minister responsible for not enacting
necessary reforms); see also Chtena, supra note 62 (indicating that, as a result of the
“terrorism and disorder” in the country, the military issued a memorandum addressed
to the President and the Prime Minister).
64. See AKŞİN, supra note 20, at 268 (noting that the Memorandum of 1971 held
the government responsible for political failures made out of line from the reforms of
Atatürk and the 1961 Constitution); see also Dokupil, supra note 16, at 80 (reasoning
that the government’s inability to govern, along with the social tensions and
economical difficulties, led to the second military intervention in Turkish politics).
65. See Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Anayasası July 20, 1961, art. 66 (Turk.) (introducing
the article regarding the authority to permit the use of armed forces); see also supra
notes 57–60 and accompanying text (discussing the novelties introduced to Turkish
politics by the 1961 Constitution). Both the 1960 Coup and the 1971 Intervention were
justified by the constitutional authorization bestowed on the Turkish army to interfere
in the political realm. See also supra note 8 and accompanying text (explaining the role
of the military as guardians of the secular Turkish Republic).
66. See Capezza, supra note 30, at 13–14 (“While the Turkish Constitution
certainly does not endorse coups, Turkish popular distrust of politicians has generally
led the public to support military action.”); see also Chtena, supra note 62 (arguing that
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instead of implementing a completely new constitution, the
military carried out constitutional amendments in a closed
process by implementing changes that strongly favored the
military’s political ideology.67 In the aftermath of the 1971
Memorandum, Turkey experienced the continuing presence of
Islamic ideologies in the political arena.68 Toward the end of the
decade, the country witnessed a resurrection of terrorism and
political violence, universities controlled by ideological groups,
and public areas as crime scenes of hundreds of unsolved
murders.69 Aggravated by the economic crisis, continuing
terrorism, and the political instability, which resulted in eleven
successive governments in only nine years, the social
polarization was exacerbated to the point where even the police
force was divided along ideological lines.70
In this unstable and violent environment, the military once
again elected to invoke its constitutional power to protect the
Turkish Republic. On September 12, 1980, the military carried
out a non-violent coup that resulted in the arrest of over 100,000

the military was actually ambivalent as to whether the Prime Minister resigned or not in
the 1971 coup which reflects the military’s preference to remain insulated from
politics).
67. See ÖZBUDUN & GENÇKAYA, supra note 34, at 113–14 (describing the 1971
amendment process as less democratic than the 1961 Constitution). These
amendments can be grouped in three categories: a) those restricting some of the civil
liberties and those limiting the review power of the courts, both of which were granted
in the 1961 Constitution; b) those strengthening the Executive by bestowing on it
legislative powers; and c) those advancing the autonomy of the military by exempting it
from civilian judiciary review. See id. at 18. Unlike in the coups d’état of 1960 and 1980,
in the 1971 intervention, the Parliament was not dissolved, political parties were not
banned, and the Constitution was not replaced nor suspended. See Capezza supra note
30, at 18. The military acted as a guide in re-establishing order. See id.
68. See Dokupil, supra note 16, at 81 (stating that the Islamist ideology was
represented by the Milli Selamet Partisi (“MSP”) [National Salvation Party]
participation in coalition governments between 1973 and 1977); see also Chtena, supra
note 62 (noting that the MSP participated in a coalition government with the CHP).
69. See AKŞİN, supra note 20, at 271–72 (summarizing the social unrest prior to the
coup, including the murders of well-known members of the police, unionists, judges,
professors, and journalists); see also Dokupil, supra note 16, at 91 (giving an account of
the civil disorder and violence between 1977 and 1980).
70. See Capezza, supra note 30, at 18 (exemplifying the civil violence and political
instability in the 1970s); Dokupil, supra note 16, at 91 (“In this polarized environment,
even the police were divided along political lines, making enforcement of the law
difficult and keeping terrorists under control impossible.”); see also Doğan, supra note
20 (listing some of the political assassinations that took place before 1980).
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people and the imprisonment of over 40,000 people.71 In
contrast to the intervention in 1971, the military used a “heavy
hand” to reestablish social and political order.72 The generals
not only drafted a completely new constitution, but they also
issued restrictive laws regulating political demonstrations and
strikes, established curfew orders, and imposed martial law.73
The extensiveness and radicalism of the 1980 military
intervention is evident in both its duration and nature of
reforms.74 Not only has the constitution it produced, albeit
significantly amended, been in place for almost three decades,
but, as evident in the fact that the next elections were not held
until 1983, the military in 1980 was also much more reluctant to
hand over the government to civilian politics.75 In order to
comprehend the developments in Turkish politics over the last
three decades, especially the rise and rule of the AKP since 2002
and the dynamics of the 2010 referendum, the 1982
Constitution and its historical context must be analyzed

71. See Gareth Jenkins, Continuity and Change: Prospects for Civil-Military Relations in
Turkey, INT’L AFF. 342 (2007) (“On 12 September 1980, as street fighting between leftist
and rightist extremists brought the country to the brink of civil war, the military staged
a third coup.”); see also Capezza, supra note 30, at 18 (discussing the results and impact
of the 1980 coup); Chtena, supra note 62 (stating that the 1980 coup occurred only
after law and order in the country collapsed and the memorandum issued by the
military was “welcomed with relief”).
72. See, e.g., supra note 67 and accompanying text (showing how military’s role in
the 1971 Intervention was moderate); see Capezza, supra note 30, at 18 (noting that the
military used a “heavy hand” to establish order).
73. See The Turkish Army: Coups Away, ECONOMIST, Feb. 13, 2010 [hereinafter
Coups Away] (characterizing the 1982 Constitution enacted by the army generals as
“authoritarian”); see also Capezza, supra note 30, at 18 (describing how military
dominated most aspects of Turkish society by taking strict control of universities,
dismissing academics, dissolving existing political parties, and enforcing martial law).
74. See Capezza, supra note 30, at 18 (noting that the 1980 military regime lasted
three years and that the constitution it issued continues to apply today); see also Coups
Away, supra note 73 (indicating that the 1982 Constitution, which promoted the
objectives of the military, is still in force today).
75. See BİLGİN, supra note 10, at 141–42 (indicating that the 1982 Constitution has
been amended numerous times); see also AKŞİN, supra note 20, at 280–81 (stating that
elections were held in 1983); Capezza, supra note 30, at 18 (noting that primary power
rested in the military leadership until Anavatan Partisi (“ANAP”) [Motherland Party]
assumed office in the 1983 elections); ÖZBUDUN & GENÇKAYA, supra note 34, at 19
(stating that during the period between the coup and the 1983 elections, the MGK
[National Security Council] wielded executive and legislative power with the intention
of restructuring Turkish democracy).
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thoroughly and the objectives of its drafters must be examined
in detail.76
D. The 1982 Constitution
The drafters of the 1982 Constitution aimed to create an
executive unaccountable to the TBMM (Turkish Grand National
Assembly) and therefore civilian politics, with the expectation
that the President would be heavily influenced by the military.77
The 1982 Constitution accordingly provided the President with
numerous powers, including the appointment of personnel in
the judiciary and military, specifically in institutions including
the Yüksek Öğretim Kurulu (“YÖK”) [Council of Higher
Education], Hakimler Savcılar Yüksek Kurulu (“HSYK”)
[Supreme Council of Judges and Public Prosecutors], the
Constitutional Court, and the Turkish Armed Forces.78 Once
again, the Constitution was drafted by Turkish elites, in contrast
to the democratic process of negotiating, bargaining, and
compromising among political parties.79 The changes
implemented with the new constitution included the
strengthening of the military’s presence in existing institutions,
as well as in the creation of new institutions.80 These new
institutions included YÖK, which oversees universities and
appoints their rectors, and HSYK, which accepts judges and
76. See infra note 77 and accompanying text (introducing the objectives of the
1982 Constitution).
77. See Chtena, supra note 62 (explaining that the 1982 Constitution guaranteed
military prominence and influence with the executive). Moreover, the first president
after the coup was the general who led it, Kenan Evren. See ÖZBUDUN & GENÇKAYA,
supra note 34, at 21 (noting that Evern, the general who led the 1980 coup served as
president until November 1989); see also Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Anayasası Nov. 7, 1982,
arts. 7–9 (Turk.) (outlining the separation of powers).
78. See ÖZBUDUN & GENÇKAYA, supra note 34, at 20, 22–23 (noting the rights
provided to the MGK by the 1982 Constitution); see also AKŞİN, supra note 20, at 276
(enumerating some of the powers granted to the President by the 1982 Constitution).
79. See ÖZBUDUN & GENÇKAYA, supra note 34, at 21 (discussing the drafting
process of the 1982 Constitution); see also BİLGİN, supra note 10, at 141 (describing the
creation phase of the 1982 Constitution as a closed process with no public
participation).
80. See Yıldırımm, supra note 6 (observing that the changes adopted following the
1980 military intervention allowed the military to be more active and effective
politically); see, e.g., Capezza, supra note 30, at 13 (“The constitution of 1982 . . .
prohibited contestation or constitutional review of the laws or decrees passed by the
military when the republic was under its rule from 1980 until 1983.”).
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public prosecutors into the legal profession and orders their
appointments, transfers, authorizations, and dismissals.81
Another critical change introduced by the 1982
Constitution, which is still debated today, involves the
constitutional powers and immunities granted to the military
and the MGK [National Security Council].82 The 1982
Constitution exempts from judicial review by the Constitutional
Court decisions of the Supreme Military Council involving highlevel military appointments, promotions, and expulsions as well
as laws and decrees passed by the MGK regime during and after
the coup d’état.83 The 1982 Constitution also established the
Devlet Güvenlik Mahkemesi (“DGM”) [State Security Courts],
in order to prosecute crimes against ideological and
philosophical constitutional principles.84 These courts were
81. See, e.g., Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Anayasasi Nov. 7, 1982, art. 130, 159 (Turk.)
(establishing and discussing the functions of YÖK and HSYK); see ÖZBUDUN &
GENÇKAYA, supra note 34, at 22 (discussing the new institutions established by the 1982
Constitution).
82. See ÖZBUDUN & GENÇKAYA, supra note 34, at 23 (discussing the privileges
military personnel were provided with by the 1982 Constitution which were named
“exit guarantees” such as exemption from the review of Court of Accounts, the High
Board of Supervision, and the decisions of the Supreme Military Council); POLICY
BRIEF, supra note 11, at 4 (noting that in the past thirty years, these privileges prevented
the military officers, including the generals behind the 1980 Coup, from being
prosecuted for the wrongdoings that took place during and after the coups); see, e.g.,
7,
2011,
9:15),
Tarık
Işık,
Darbecilere
Son
Darbe,
RADİKAL (Aug.
http://www.radikal.com.tr/Radikal.aspx?aType=RadikalDetayV3&ArticleID=1059118&
CategoryID=77 (illustrating that amendments to one of the constitutional articles that
provided the military with a legal exit guarantee for their actions in the coups is
currently being debated); see also Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Anayasasi Nov. 7, 1982, art. 15
(Turk.) (limiting the exercise of fundamental rights and freedoms during times of war,
mobilization, and martial law). The immunities that prevented members of the military
from being prosecuted for their actions related to the coups was a highly controversial
issue debated during the 2010 referendum. See, e.g., Işık, supra (illustrating that
amendments to one of the constitutional articles that provided the military with a legal
exit guarantee for their actions in the coups is currently being debated).
83. See ÖZBUDUN & GENÇKAYA, supra note 34, at 23 (noting the exemptions the
1982 Constitution provided); see also Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Anayasası July 20, 1961 art.
136 (Turk.) (noting that following the 1971 Intervention, the 1973 amendments to
Article 136 of the 1961 Constitution established the DGMs [State Security Courts]).
The DGMs were established to try cases involving crimes against the security of the state
and organized crime. See William Hale, Turkish Democracy in Travail: The Case of the State
Security Courts, THE WORLD TODAY, 186–94 (1977) (discussing the establishment of
DGMs).
84. See BİLGİN, supra note 10, at 140 (discussing the creation of DGMs); see also
Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Anayasası Nov. 7, 1982, art. 143 (Turk.) (establishing the DGMs).
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granted special rules of criminal procedure that weakened due
process protection, and, therefore, allowed the military to
silence anti-secular voices in the society.85
E. Military Intervention of 1997
From 1983 to the mid-1990s, Prime Minister Turgut Özal
led Turkey in a period of increased international engagement,
applying for EU membership in 1987 and re-establishing
diplomatic connections with Turkic nations and former Soviet
states.86 The first amendments to the 1982 Constitution (“1987
amendments”) were passed in this period, resulting in increased
constitutional flexibility and greater public control over future
constitutional amendments.87
During the 1990s, Turkey suffered from political instability
caused by short-lived coalition governments, and resulting in
high inflation rates and the re-proliferation of Islamist voices in
politics.88 A second wave of constitutional reforms was initiated

85. See Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Anayasası Nov. 7, 1982, art. 143 (Turk.) (outlining
the functions and composition of DGMs); see also Banani, supra note 31, at 123
(explaining that because of State Security Courts’ special rules of procedure, the EU
has pressured Turkey to either abolish the courts or to harmonize their procedures
with other state and federal courts as well as with the European Convention on Human
Rights); Hale, supra note 83, at 187 (noting that the DGMs exercised special
jurisdiction over crimes covered by ninety-nine different articles of the Penal Code,
which have been used mainly against the Islamist right wing, but also against leftists in
order to protect Atatürk’s secularist reforms).
86. See AKŞİN, supra note 20, at 287–88 (discussing the political changes under
Prime Minister Turgut Özal, which included opening up Turkey’s international
relations); see also Chtena, supra note 62 (noting that Özal was the first civilian to be
elected as president); Sedat Laçiner, Turgut Özal Period in Turkish Foreign Policy: Özalism,
2 USAK Y.B. INT’L POLS. & L. 14 (2009), available at http://www.turkishweekly.net/
article/333/turgut-ozal-period-in-turkish-foreign-policy-ozalism.html
(“The
most
important development for Turkey in the post-Cold War was the emergence of the
Turkic world . . . . [These Turkic peoples] were freed from 150 years of Russian
rule . . . .”).
87. See ÖZBUDUN & GENÇKAYA, supra note 34, at 32–33 (discussing the 1987
amendments to the 1982 Constitution, which eased the process for making future
constitutional changes). See generally Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Anayasasi Nov. 7, 1982,
amend. I (Turk.) (amended through 2010) (marking the first amendments to the 1982
Constitution as those made in 1987).
88. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of State, supra note 9 (noting the political
instability during the 1990s); see also BİLGİN, supra note 10, at 142–43 (examining the
setbacks in Turkish politics in the late 1990s, which led to the victory of an Islamist
party).
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in 1995.89 In the same year, the Islamist Refah Partisi (“RP”)
[Welfare Party] received twenty-one percent of the votes,
sufficient to allow its leader to form a coalition government and
become the first Islamist prime minister of Turkey.90 The RP’s
success shifted the political focus from constitutional
democratization to the preservation of secularism, triggering a
heightened military influence in Turkish politics, which
culminated in another military intervention in February 1997.91
Unlike the three previous coups d’état, the military did not take
over the government, but rather conducted a “post-modern
coup” by proposing an eighteen-article precaution package.92
Under heavy military pressure, the RP’s leader, Necmettin
Erbakan, peacefully resigned from his post, manifesting the
progress of Turkish democratic forces since the last coup
d’etat.93 A few months later the RP was banned for its antisecular activities.94 This intervention, however, did not slow
down the political Islamists, who had formed a new party, Fazilet

89. See BİLGİN, supra note 10, at 142 (noting the second wave of amendments); see
also Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Anayasasi Nov. 7, 1982 (Turk.) (amended 1995) (listing
amendments to fourteen articles in 1995: Articles 33, 52, 53, 67, 68, 69, 75, 84, 85, 93,
127, 135, 149, and 171).
90. See AKŞİN , supra note 20, at 296 (discussing Refah Partisi’s (“RP”) success); see
also Dokupil, supra note 16, at 109 (marking Erbakan as Turkey’s first Islamic prime
minister).
91. See AKŞİN, supra note 20, at 301 (noting the intervention that took place on
February 28, 1997); See also BİLGİN, supra note 10, at 143 (noting the greater military
influence on politics in 1997).
92. See AKŞİN, supra note 20, at 301 (noting the eighteen-article precaution
package proposed by the military to prevent against the fundamental Islamist
government); see also Chtena, supra note 62 (quoting Stephen Kinzer, Pro-Islamic
Premier Steps Down in Turkey Under Army Pressure, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 1997
(characterizing the 1997 military intervention as a “soft coup”).
93. See Dokupil, supra note 16, at 117–19 (stating that the intervention resulted in
the political ban in 1998 of RP and six of its deputies, including Erbakan, for carrying
out
anti-secular,
pro-Islamist
policies
and,
therefore,
violating
the
Constitution); see also Chtena, supra note 62 (noting that Erbakan complied with the
army directives by resigning). But cf. supra note 54 and accompanying text (stating that
the 1960 Coup had ended with the execution of Prime Minister Menderes and other
prominent politicians).
94. See AKŞİN, supra note 20, at 303 (noting the decision to ban the RP on January
16, 1998); see also ANAYASA MAHKEMESİ GEREKÇELİ KARAR REFAH PARTİSİ’NİN
KAPATILMASI [Reasoned Decision of the Turkish Constitutional Court: Closing of the
Welfare Party], Decision No. 1998/1, 1998, available at http://www.belgenet.com/
dava/rpdava_g01.html (indicating the RP closure decision by the Constitutional
Court).
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Partisi (“FP”) [Virtue Party], months before the ban.95 Yet, the
FP joined its political party predecessors when the
Constitutional Court held its Islamist agenda to be against the
principle of secularism.96 Once again, this decision proved to be
no obstacle for advocates of RP and FP, who shortly thereafter
formed a new political party, the Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi
(“AKP”) [Justice and Development Party], under the leadership
of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.97
F. Justice and Development Party, 2002–Present
In November 2002, the AKP received over thirty-four
percent of the total votes and formed the first single-party
government, headed by an Islamist political party, in Turkish
history.98 Unlike the RP or the FP, the AKP abandoned the antisecular Islamic framework, and embraced a moderate
“conservative” position.99 From his party’s inception, to its rise
to power, Erdoğan proclaimed the AKP’s commitment to the
EU accession process, the development and stabilization of

95. See Capezza, supra note 30, at 20 (marking when Fazilet Partisi (“FP”) was
formed as prior to the date the Welfare Party (“RP”) was banned); see also Dokupil,
supra note 16, at 119 (arguing that the ban was anticipated, allowing the RP members
to establish a new Islamic party in advance of the decision).
96. See Dokupil, supra note 16, at 124 (discussing the banning of the FP); see also
Capezza, supra note 30, at 20 (explaining that the FP was banned for having an
unconstitutionally Islamist platform); see also ANAYASA MAHKEMESİ GEREKÇELİ KARAR
FAZİLET PARTİSİ’NİN KAPATILMASI [Reasoned Decision of the Turkish Constitutional
Court: Closing of the Virtue Party], Decision No. 2001/2, 2001, available at
http://www.belgenet.com/arsiv/fazilet.html (reporting the FP closure decision by the
Constitutional Court).
97. See Capezza, supra note 30, at 20 (noting the founding of the AKP under
Erdoğan); see, e.g., Dokupil, supra note 16, at 106 (exemplifying the new mayor
Erdoğan’s anti-Kemalist acts, including a reading of the Quran at the opening of a city
council meeting).
98. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of State, supra note 9 (reporting the votes the
AKP received in 2002); supra note 90 and accompanying text (designating Erbakan as
the first Islamic prime minister in a coalition government).
99. See Capezza, supra note 30, at 20 (describing Erdoğan as a skilled politician
who moderated his party’s image); see also Dokupil, supra note 16, at 127 (stating that
Erdoğan abandoned his former hard-line Islamist rhetoric in support of a secular
Turkey); Menderes Çınar, The Militarization of Secular Opposition in Turkey; Report,
INSIGHT TURKEY, Apr.–June 2010, at 109 (noting however that the AKP does not
endorse Islamic modernism, the idea that Islam is a form of life that is compatible with
modernity as well as democracy).

302 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 34:279
Turkey’s foreign relations, and economic reform.100 The AKP
was able to attract voters from a broader political spectrum than
the RP or the FP by drawing on the similarity between the EU
membership requirements and the AKP’s democratization
goals.101 Both agendas advocate the reduction of military
influence in Turkish politics.102 Consequently, immediately after
its rise to power in 2002, the AKP implemented a significant
push toward Europeanization and democratization by passing
numerous constitutional amendments.103 Following its second
victory in general elections, the AKP engaged in the process of
re-defining the notions of national identity and secularism.104
The AKP’s democratic initiative allowed the party to downgrade
the role of the military, which was further weakened by the
Ergenekon cases, named after an alleged secret network that
included academics, businessmen, journalists, military officers,
and politicians who were accused of plotting a coup d’etat to
overthrow the AKP government.105 Although it is argued that the
100. See Ulusoy, supra note 48 (noting the AKP’s commitment to the EU-accession
process).
101. See Capezza, supra note 30, at 20 (noting that the AKP aimed to appeal to an
audience larger than the “Islamist base”); Ulusoy, supra note 48 (stating that the AKP
viewed the EU accession process and the EU’s priority of increasing the
democratization of Turkey as being in line with their efforts to weaken military control
in Turkish politics).
102. See Ulusoy, supra note 48 (noting that the EU accession requirements gave
the AKP the opportunity to weaken military control in Turkish politics); Ward, supra
note 21, at 222 (“[T]he AKP has, in opposing Kemalism, actually assumed the essential
plank of Atatürk’s European policy, to identify with it, and join it.”).
103. See ÖZBUDUN & GENÇKAYA, supra note 34, at 73 (summarizing the AKP’s
efforts to harmonize Turkish law with the 2001 and 2004 constitutional amendments as
well as with EU legislation); see also Çınar, supra note 99, at 110 (emphasizing the
democratization process the AKP implemented in its early years).
104. See Ulusoy, supra note 48 (discussing the AKP’s victory for a second
consecutive term); see also Çınar, supra note 99, at 2 (observing that the AKP represents
“a very loose redefinition of secularism . . . that accommodates Islamic public visibility
in Turkey”).
105. See, e.g., General Işık Koşaner, Chief of the Turkish General Staff,
Resignation Statement (July 29, 2011), available at http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB10001424053111903520204576480440105206166.html (noting the extent of the
arrests in a speech, observing that “[a]t the moment, 250 generals and admirals,
officers, non-commissioned officers and special Gendarmerie sergeants, 173 of them
on active duty and 77 of them about be retired, are in detention deprived of their
freedom”); Rosemary Righter, Erdoğan 1, Atatürk 0, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 15, 2011, available
at http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2011/08/07/turkey-s-military-resignations
-make-erdogan-even-stronger.html (“Turkey now tops the world in jailing its journalists,
surpassing China and Iran. Nearly 70 are in prison, thousands more are under
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evidence was insufficient to prove a widespread plot, Ergenekon
prosecutions resulted in the arrest of numerous retired and
active duty officers, severely damaging the prestigious role of the
military as the protectors of the Turkish state.106 The Ergenekon
cases allowed the AKP to gradually marginalize the military’s
role in the political sphere, thus clearing a strong obstacle from
its path toward enhanced democratization of political society.107
Several months prior to the Ergenekon trials, in March 2008,
Turkey’s chief prosecutor had initiated a case against the AKP
seeking to ban the party for its “anti-secular” activities.108 This
ban case was supported by the military.109 Some segments of
Turkish society began to view the Ergenekon trials as the AKP’s
response to this ban case.110 Unlike the RP and FP, the AKP was
not banned.111 However, due to the fact that the party was a focal
interrogation . . . .”); see Ulusoy, supra note 48 (noting that a number of retired and
active duty officer were arrested under the Ergenekon case); see also Coups Away, supra
note 73, at 2 (stating that the case is named after an alleged network of “rogue security
officers, academics, journalists, and businessmen”).
106. See Capezza, supra note 30, at 22 (noting that the Ergenekon prosecutions
led to the arrest of hundreds of people); see also Ulusoy, supra note 48 (explaining how
the Ergenekon cases damaged the prestigious role of the military in Turkey); Compare
Coups Away, supra note 73 (arguing that the network was accused of conspiring to
commit political violence and chaos in the country to justify a coup against the AKP),
with Çınar, supra note 99 (distinguishing the Ergenekon case as an event that declared
military interventions an illegal process that must be submitted to the rule of law).
107. See Ulusoy, supra note 48 (describing the marginalization process of the
military); see also BİLGİN, supra note 10, at 143–44 (noting that the reforms
implemented between 2001 and 2004 were focused on eliminating military influence
over politics).
108. See ANAYASA MAHKEMESİ KARARI [Decision of the Turkish Constitutional
Court:], Decision No. 2008/2, 2008, available at http://www.anayasa.gov.tr/
index.php?l=manage_karar&ref=show&action=karar&id=2611&content (indicating the
Constitutional Court decision dismissing the ban case against the AKP initiated by the
Chief Prosecutor, which resulted in a warning). See generally SETA FOUND. POL., ECON.,
& SOC. RES., THE CASE AGAINST THE JUSTICE AND DEVELOPMENT PARTY, (AKP PARTY)
(2008), available at http://www.setav.org/ups/dosya/10343.pdf (summarizing the
closure case against the AKP).
109. See Coups Away, supra note 73 (arguing that the military implicitly supported
the chief prosecutor initiating the ban of the AKP). See supra notes 26–27 and
accompanying text (describing the business circles, the military and the judiciary as
forming the secular nationalist stronghold of Turkish society).
110. See Coups Away, supra note 73 (arguing that the AKP fought back after the
military implicitly supported the ban case against the AKP); see also Ulusoy, supra note
48 (considering the Ergenekon case as a “bold step[]” taken by the AKP in the realm of
civilian-military relations after the closure case against the party).
111. See ANAYASA MAHKEMESİ KARARI [Decision of the Turkish Constitutional
Court], Decision No. 2008/2, 2008, available at http://www.anayasa.gov.tr/
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point of anti-secular activities, the Court issued a warning and
fined the AKP in the amount of US$29 million.112
Despite increasing criticism from some segments of society,
the AKP’s victory in the July 2007 elections, with almost fortyseven percent of the total votes, reaffirmed that a significant
portion of Turkish society might favor the reevaluation of the
secularist/Kemalist
and
pro-Western/pro-EU
policies.113
Nonetheless, the AKP further consolidated its power when its
presidential nominee, Abdullah Gül, Erdoğan’s long-term
comrade, was elected by an AKP-dominated TBMM in August
2007.114 With this election, any possibility of presidential vetoes
regarding the constitutionality of future AKP legislation, seemed
to have been removed.115 Considering that almost all of the EU
harmonization packages have been implemented under the AKP
governments in the past nine years, a further study of recent
Turkey-EU history is necessary to understand the AKP’s
proposed changes and partially employed, including the
constitutional reform package (“Package”) that led to the
constitutional referendum of 2010.116
index.php?l=manage_karar&ref=show&action=karar&id=2611&content (noting the
Constitutional Court decision dismissing the ban case against the AKP); see also İHSAN
DAĞI, SETA FOUND. FOR POLITICAL, ECON. AND SOC. RESEARCH, BRIEF NO: 19, POLICY
BRIEF: AK PARTY SURVIVES CLOSURE CASE: WHAT IS NEXT? 1, 5–6 (Aug. 2008), available
at
http://www.setav.org/public/HaberDetay.aspx?Dil=tr&hid=7376&q=ak-partysurvives-closure-case-what-is-next (analyzing the closure case against the AKP and
explaining the verdict).
112. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of State, supra note 9 (noting the Constitutional
Court’s decision to cut state funding for the AKP in half); see also Ulusoy, supra note 48
(noting that this amount corresponds to half of the AKP’s state funding).
113. See Dokupil, supra note 16, at 55 (arguing that the success of Islamist parties
suggests that many Turks favor a reevlauation of secularism in Turkey); see Ulusoy,
supra note 48 (stating that the AKP received 46.7% of the votes in the 2007 elections).
114. See Capezza, supra note 30, at 22 (noting Gül’s appointment as the 2007
presidential candidate for Erdoğan’s AKP party); see also Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of
State, supra note 9 (describing Gül’s election).
115. See Capezza, supra note 30, at 22 (nothing that the creation of a strong
unaccountable presidency is a common objective stipulated by the military in the 1982
Constitution and the AKP in the reform package, both of which contemplated that the
position would be filled with someone favorable, enabling each to influence the
policies of the country); see, e.g., Late Reflections on Referendum, TURKISH DAILY NEWS,
Oct. 17, 2007 (giving the example that, after Gül assumed office, the question of direct
election of the president was submitted to popular vote).
116. See supra note 100–02 and accompanying text (illustrating the congruence of
EU requirements and AKP reform proposals); see also TOKTAŞ & KURT, supra note 55, at
3 (“Turkey has already adopted nine EU harmonization packages . . . [m]ost of the
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G. Turkey’s EU Application Process and Reforms under the AKP
Turkey is the longest-standing candidate for membership in
the EU.117 Its initial application to the European Economic
Community (“EEC”), the first economic organization of
European states, dates back to the 1950s.118 Turkey entered into
a customs union agreement with the EEC in 1995 and was finally
considered eligible for EU membership in 1999.119 This Section
focuses on the most recent period of Turkish-European
relations starting in 1999.
After the EU formally declared Turkey’s candidacy, Turkey
attempted to accelerate its efforts to meet the Copenhagen
Criteria, the formal name for EU membership criteria.120
Beginning with the Turkish National Programme for the
Adoption of the Acquis (“NPAA”), in 2001, Turkey witnessed
the most radical changes to its constitution since 1982.121 As a
result of these reform efforts, the EU commenced formal

reforms that have been implemented to date were initiated and conducted by the AKP
government in the 2000s.”). See generally ÖZBUDUN & GENÇKAYA, supra note 34, at 49–
79 (listing the contents of constitutional amendments implemented between 2001 and
2006).
117. See Ward, supra note 21, at 208 (noting that Turkey is the longest-standing
applicant to the EU); see also ÖZBUDUN & GENÇKAYA, supra note 34, at 81 (noting the
historical character of Turkey’s application to join the EU).
118. See Ward, supra note 21, at 208 (stating that the initial application for
“association” with the European Economic Community was made in the early 1950s);
see also AKŞİN, supra note 20, at 287 (noting that the official application for membership
was made by Ozal in 1987).
119. See AKŞİN, supra note 20, at 296 (noting that the customs agreement with the
European Union was signed on March 6, 1995); see also Ward, supra note 21, at 208–09
(summarizing the history of Turkey’s attempts at EU accession); ÖZBUDUN &
GENÇKAYA, supra note 34, at 82 (discussing the development of Turkey’s EU candidacy
during the 1990s).
120. See ÖZBUDUN & GENÇKAYA, supra note 34, at 85 (discussing reforms needed
for Turkey to meet the Copenhagen Criteria); see also Glossary Definition of Accession
Criteria (Copenhagen Criteria), EUROPA.COM (Nov. 22, 2010), http://europa.eu/
legislation_summaries/glossary/accession_criteria_copenhague_en.htm (last visited
Jan. 30, 2011) (listing the three criteria a new member state must meet to join the EU).
121. See Banani, supra note 31, at 124 (discussing the adoption of the Turkish
National Programme for the Adoption of the Acquis (“NPAA”)); see also BİLGİN, supra
note 10, at 143–44 (noting the radical political and economic reforms adopted by
Turkey after 2001 including the abolishment of the death penalty, adoption of equality
of spouses, abolishment of DGMs and increase of civilian members of MGKs,
prevention of torture and mistreatment, and restrictions on party closures).

306 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 34:279
accession negotiations with Turkey in October 2005.122 While
Turkey’s military had divided sentiments toward the EU
accession process and questioned its consistency with the
Kemalist ideology, the progress toward meeting the EU
membership criteria during the first three years of AKP rule
proved that the party was committed to joining the EU and had
adopted the cause of European integration as its primary goal.123
Nonetheless, the commonality between the reforms
implemented for the EU accession process and for the AKP’s
Anti-Kemalist, Islamist agenda raised suspicions in some
segments of Turkish society regarding the AKP’s motivations.124
While the AKP had initially presented itself as a moderate
conservative party, with a heavily Islamist background, aiming to
reinterpret Kemalism in Turkey, it has nonetheless proven itself
to be the first party to achieve success in advancing Turkey’s
path to joining the EU.125 Some scholars have noted the irony
that the AKP has now subsumed Atatürk’s original intention of
creating a European Turkey.126

122. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of State, supra note 9 (listing key events in the
history of Turkey’s attempted accession to the EU); see also Ward, supra note 21, at 210
(noting that the projections of the Copenhagen Council in 2002 were that accession
negotiations would commence with Turkey in December 2004, if the country met the
Copenhagen Criteria).
123. See, e.g., ÖZBUDUN & GENÇKAYA, supra note 34, at 73 (noting that six of the
nine harmonization packages were promulgated under the AKP government); see
Capezza, supra note 30, at 20 (observing that the AKP embraced the EU accession
process).
124. See Ward, supra note 21, at 222 (stating that the case for the EU is aligned
with the anti-Kemalist case); see also Adrien Katherine Wing, International Law,
Secularism, and the Islamic World, 24 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 407, 421 (2009) (defining the
AKP as a group of politicians that are heavily Islamist, causing some secular Turks to
fear a change in laws under the AKP government).
125. See Ward, supra note 21, at 222 (discussing the AKP’s pursuit of toward the
EU accession process); see, e.g., ÖZBUDUN & GENÇKAYA, supra note 34, at 73 (noting two
thirds of the harmonization packages were affected under the AKP government).
126. See Ward, supra note 21, at 222 (arguing that the AKP, by standing in
opposition to Kemalism, in reality embraced Atatürk’s European policy); Press Release,
U.S. Dep’t of State, supra note 9, at 3 (suggesting that the current is rooted in a
tradition of challenge to Kemalist principles).
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II. REFERENDUM PROCESS, THE AMENDMENT PACKAGE,
AND SEPTEMBER 12, 2010, RESULTS
The AKP’s efforts to reform Turkish politics continued
after 2005 when the party pushed for more radical changes to
revise, if not replace, the amended 1982 Constitution with the
2010 Reform Package, marking the latest reform attempt.127 Part
II of this Comment introduces the articles amended in the
Package, examines the referendum process and its results, and
discusses the reactions to the results by Turkish society, domestic
and foreign politicians, and the media. Specifically, Section A
observes the developments with regard to constitutional
amendments between 2007 and 2010, including the failed AKP
attempt to draft a completely new constitution in 2007. Section
B discusses the six-month period immediately prior to the
referendum, beginning in March 2010, when the AKP
announced its decision to propose an amendment package.
Section C examines the amended articles and distinguishes the
revisions made to the constitutional text. Finally, Section D
presents the referendum results and the different statements
and reviews made by Turkish and non-Turkish politicians and
media.
A. Amendments, 2007–2010
Amending the 1982 Constitution is not a novel topic in
Turkish politics.128 Following this propensity, a new constitution
127. See Law No. 5982 of May 7, 2010, Resmi Gazete [R.G.] No. 27580 (May 13,
2010) (Turk.) (providing the 2010 Reform Package (“Package”) with proposed
amendments to the Turkish Constitution). An English translation of the Package is
available at http://www.abgs.gov.tr/files/BasınMusavirlik/haberler/constituional_
amendments.pdf. See generally Anayasa Değişiklik Paketini Anlama Kilavuzu [A Guide to
Understanding the Constitutional Amendment Package] TURKISH ASIAN CTR. FOR
STRATEGIC
STUDIES
(Aug.
2010)
[hereinafter
TASAM],
available
at
http://www.tasam.org/Files/PDF/referandumkilavuz.pdf (listing and analyzing all of
the changes proposed in the 2010 reform package and their consequences).
128. See SETA FOUND. FOR POLITICAL, ECON., AND SOC. RESEARCH, SETA ANALİZ ,
2010’DA TÜRKİYE [SETA ANALYSIS, TURKEY IN 2010] 6, 48 (Jan. 2011), available at
http://setav.org/ups/dosya/59657.pdf (noting that the Turkish public is not a
stranger to referendum and constitutional changes and that there has been a
consensus among the political parties and the public in support of a new, civil, and
democratic constitution). See generally Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Anayasası Nov. 7, 1982
(Turk.) (amended 2010) (indicating that between 1982 and 2010, the 1982
Constitution was amended seventeen times in total). A version of the Constitution of
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had long been on the AKP’s agenda and even more so after its
re-election in 2007.129 Almost all of the propositions brought to
the table by the AKP prior to the Package had been opposed by
the former President, the military, the Constitutional Court, the
main opposition party, the CHP, and certain segments of the
public, who suspected that the AKP was motivated by a “hidden
Islamist agenda” incompatible with the secular character of the
Turkish state.130 The prospects of a new or amended
constitution proposed by the AKP improved with the election of
Abdullah Gül as the President of the Republic, an office that
had been regarded as an instrument of checks and balances (in
addition to the military) by the secular elite.131 In light of the
Turkish president’s broad governmental appointment powers,
the election of an AKP ally as President was viewed by this group
as signifying the fall of a fundamental stronghold of the
secularists and the rise of an even greater threat to Kemalist
principles.132
the Republic of Turkey, as amended since 1982, is available at
http://www.anayasa.gen.tr/1982ay.htm.
129. See Jonathan Head, Why Turkey’s Constitutional Referendum Matters, BBC NEWS
(Sep. 10, 2010, 10:42 PM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-11263302?
print=true (noting that the AKP talked about amending the Constitution for a number
of years, but, until the Package in 2010, it had not taken action); see also Erdogan Says to
(Sept.
12,
2010),
Start
Work
on
New
Constitution,
ALARABIYA.NET
http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2010/09/13/119168.html (reporting Erdoğan’s
statement of his party’s intent to start drafting a new constitution after the AKP was reelected in 2007).
130. See ÖZBUDUN & GENÇKAYA, supra note 34, at 103 (indicating the secularists’
fear that an Islamist presidency would threaten the secular foundations of the country);
see also Head, supra note 129 (discussing the uneasy sentiment of many secular Turks
regarding Erdoğan’s government and handling of the Package). Turkish secularists
consist mainly of elites and the well-educated upper classes in metropolitan areas. See
supra note 28 and accompanying text.
131. See Playing Safe, ECONOMIST, Apr. 25, 2007 (noting that Abdullah Gül is the
AKP’s candidate for presidency and if elected, Gül can be expected to endorse the AKP
government’s strategies); ÖZBUDUN & GENÇKAYA, supra note 34, at 103 (describing the
Office of the President as a mechanism of checks and balances that state elites may
exercise over the President). See generally supra note 114 and accompanying text
(discussing Gül’s appointment to the presidency).
132. See ÖZBUDUN & GENÇKAYA, supra note 34, at 103 (indicating that, in the past,
the presidential powers granted by the Constitution, similar to those granted to the
military, enabled the President to interfere and prevent an Islamist party from
implementing laws that would strip away the secularist character of the Constitution,
the judicial system, and the universities); see, e.g., Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Anayasasi Nov.
7, 1982, amend. XVI (Turk.) (stipulating that all Constitutional Court members be
elected by the president).
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In early 2007, the AKP began the process of drafting a new
constitution.133 Although the proposed constitution seemed to
serve democracy and liberalism far more than the 1982
Constitution, it was heavily criticized by the same segments of
the Turkish public.134 Before the draft constitution was
announced, it was leaked to the media, leading to a firm
opposition from members of the military-civilian bureaucracy
and, therefore, the postponement of the campaign to reform
the Constitution.135
B. Referendum Process, March–September 2010
In late March 2010, the AKP announced the reform
Package.136 Twenty-six amendments were approved by the
TBMM on May 7, 2010, clearing the Package’s path to the
president’s signature and popular vote.137 Yet the two opposition
parties contested the constitutionality of the Package, requesting
its annulment for violating the secularism principle in the
133. See ÖZBUDUN & GENÇKAYA, supra note 34, at 104–05 (indicating that in June
2007, Erdoğan requested that several constitutional law professors draft a new
constitution); see also POLICY BRIEF, supra note 11, at 3 (noting that Erdoğan asked a
group of law professors, headed by Ergun Özbudun, to prepare a new draft
constitution).
134. See POLICY BRIEF, supra note 11, at 3 (“[T]he draft constitution was more
democratic and liberal than the present Turkish Constitution.”); see also ÖZBUDUN &
GENÇKAYA, supra note 34, at 105 (noting that the draft was not welcomed by those
fearing the AKP’s hidden Islamist agenda); supra note 130 and accompanying text
(describing the secularist groups opposing the AKP).
135. See ÖZBUDUN & GENÇKAYA, supra note 34, at 105 (noting that the AKP’s
original intent had been to foster a broad public debate before the draft would be
presented to the TBMM, followed by a referendum); see also POLICY BRIEF, supra note
11, at 3 (noting that the draft of the Constitution was leaked to the media prior to it
becoming public and that strict public opposition formed immediately thereafter).
136. See Law No. 5982 of May 7, 2010, Resmi Gazete [R.G.] No. 27580 (May 13,
2010) (Turk.) (presenting the twenty-six article reform package); see also Paşalara Yüce
Divan Yolu, MILLIYET.COM.TR (Mar. 30, 2010), http://www.milliyet.com.tr/Siyaset/
HaberDetay.aspx?aType=HaberDetay&ArticleID=1218095&Date=29.01.2011&Kategori=
siyaset&b=Pasalara%20Yuce%20Divan%20yolu (discussing the content of the two
articles added to the package at the last minute).
137. See Turkey’s Parliament Clears Way for Constitution Referendum, EURACTIV.COM
(May 7, 2010) [hereinafter Turkey’s Parliament], http://www.euractiv.com/
enlargement/turkeys-parliament-clears-way-referendum-news-493906 (reporting the
TBMM voting process and approval of the amendment package); POLICY BRIEF, supra
note 11, at 4 (stating that in order for a bill to become law in the Turkish parliament,
two-thirds of the deputies, 367 out of 550 votes, must vote in the affirmative, whereas a
minimum of 330 votes are sufficient to put the bill to a referendum).
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Constitution.138 In less than two months, on July 7, 2010, the
Court announced its decision to approve most of the
amendments, annulling only the procedures regarding the
nomination of members to the Constitutional Court and to the
HSYK (Supreme Council of Judges and Public Prosecutors).139
This decision allowed the Package to move toward referendum
on September 12, 2010.140
C. The Amendment Package
The Package consisted of twenty-six amendments that can
be grouped into two parts: reforms regarding fundamental
rights and freedoms (Articles 1, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 23) and those
concerning the reorganization of the judiciary (Articles 11 and
14–22).141 The following sections will discuss certain
amendments proposed in the Package.
1. Article 1: Equality before the Law
Article 1 of the Package seeks to revise Article 10 of the preamendment 1982 Constitution concerning equality of all
citizens before the law.142 This article was proposed to conform
138. See POLICY BRIEF, supra note 11, at 4 (noting the annulment case initiated by
the two main opposition parties); see also Court Ruling Throws Turkey into Pre-Election
Mode, THE DAILY STAR, July 9, 2010, http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Middle-East/
Jul/09/Court-ruling-throws-Turkey-into-pre-election-mode.ashx#axzz1cu0WwFZO
(“Opponents see the reforms as a government attempt to . . . undermine Turkey’s
secular principles. . . . The opposition had asked the entire package to be thrown
out.”).
139. See POLICY BRIEF, supra note 11, at 4 (stating that the Court amended the
content of two main articles (Articles 146 and 159), and two related, provisional articles
(Articles 18 and 19) regarding the organization of the Constitutional Court and
HSYK); see also Dan Bilefsky & Sebnem Arsu, Turkish Court Rejects Parts of Constitution
Overhaul, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 2010, at A9 (announcing the Court’s partial rejection of
the reform package).
140. See Turkey’s Parliament, supra note 137 (discussing the path of the Package
toward a referendum); see also POLICY BRIEF, supra note 11, at 4 (noting the date for the
referendum).
141. See POLICY BRIEF, supra note 11, at 5–6 (grouping the Package into two
categories). See generally Law No. 5982 of May 7, 2010, Resmi Gazete [R.G.] No. 27580
(May 13, 2010) (Turk.) (listing the amendments in the Package).
142. Law No. 5982, art. 1 (noting the amendment to Article 10 in its original
language); POLICY BRIEF, supra note 11, at 9 (explaining, in an English translation, that
the following phrases were added to the text of the Constitution: “The measures to be
taken to this end [equality between men and women] shall not be interpreted as
against the principle of equality. The measures taken for children, elderly, disabled
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Turkey’s constitution with the EU’s Charter on Fundamental
Rights and aims to create a foundation in the Constitution for
positive discrimination, favoring citizens in need of special
protection, including children, the elderly, disabled people,
widows, invalids, veterans, and orphans of martyrs.143
2. Article 6: Right of Collective Bargaining
Article 6 of the Package revises Article 53 of the preamendment 1982 Constitution regarding the right of collective
bargaining and grants union rights to civil servants allowing
them to engage in collective bargaining.144 The consolidated
version proposes: “Civil servants and other public officials have
the right to conclude collective agreement[s] . . . [and i]n case
of disputes, . . . appeal to the Conciliation Board of Public
Servants, [decisions of which] shall be decisive and in the force
of collective agreement.”145 In addition, the changes allow
provisions of collective agreements to be reflected on
pensioners.146
people, widows and orphans of martyrs as well as for invalid and veterans shall not be
considered as against the principle of equality”).
143. Law No. 5982, art. 1 (noting the amendment to Article 10 in its original
language); see POLICY BRIEF, supra note 11, at 5, 9 (stating that the “article was
reformulated in light of EU’s Charter on Fundamental Rights;” and explaining that:
Men and women have equal rights. The State shall have the
obligation to ensure that this equality exists in practice. The
measures to be taken for children, elderly, disabled people, widows
and orphans of martyrs as well as for invalids and veterans shall not
be considered as against the principle of equality.
See generally ENSAROĞLU supra note 60, at 8–11 (analyzing the amendment to Article 10
within the context of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights).
144. Law No. 5982, art. 6 (removing the third and fourth paragraphs from the
53rd Article of the Constitution, but adding in part that civil servants and other public
officials have the right of collective bargaining); see ENSAROĞLU, supra note 60, at 21–22
(discussing the amendment to Article 53 within the context of international human
rights and democratization).
145. Law No. 5982, art. 6 (noting the amendment to Article 53 in its original
language); POLICY BRIEF, supra note 11, at 11 (comparing a translated version of the
language of Article 53 in the 1982 Constitution to the proposed change in the
Package).
146. Law No. 5982, art. 6 (noting the amendment to Article 53 in its original
language); see POLICY BRIEF, supra note 11, at 11 (translating into English the textual
changes proposed by the Package to Article 53 of the 1982 Constitution: “reflection of
the provisions of collective agreement on the pensioners . . . shall be regulated by
law”).
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3. Article 7: Right to Strike and Lockout
Article 7 of the Package repeals the third and seventh
paragraphs of Article 54 of the Constitution regarding the right
to strike and lockout.147 The repealed portions held labor
unions liable for any damage caused in a work place during
strikes and prohibited “politically motivated strikes and
lockouts, solidarity strikes and lockouts, occupation of work
premises, labour go-slows, and other forms of obstruction.”148
With this change, Article 54 brings union rights in Turkey closer
to the human rights standards of developed democracies.149
4. Article 8: Right to Petition, Right to Information and Appeal
to the Ombudsman
Article 8 of the Package revises Article 74 of the preamendment 1982 Constitution regarding the right to petition.150
The title of Article 74 is changed in the proposal, translated to
mean “Right to Petition, Right to Information, and Appeal to

147. Law No. 5982, art. 7 (proposing changes to Article 54); see POLICY BRIEF,
supra note 11, at 12 (comparing the language of Article 54 in the 1982 Constitution
regarding the right to strike and lockout to the proposed language in the Package).
148. See Law No. 5982, art. 7 (noting the language proposed for removal in its
original language); POLICY BRIEF, supra note 11, at 12 (comparing an English
translation of the language of Article 54 in the 1982 Constitution to the proposed
change in the Package); see ENSAROĞLU, supra note 60, at 23 (noting that the Package
removes many of the prohibitions regarding general and politically motivated strikes
and lockouts, which were introduced by the 1980 Coup in the 1982 Constitution). Goslows, or slowdowns, are industrial actions where employees work more slowly to
persuade an employer to agree to higher pay or better working conditions. CAMBRIDGE
DICTIONARIES ONLINE, http://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/british/go-slow
(last visited Nov. 14, 2011).
149. See POLICY BRIEF, supra note 11, at 12 (comparing an English translation of
the language of Article 54 in the 1982 Constitution regarding the right to strike and
lockout to the proposed language in the Package); see also ENSAROĞLU, supra note 60,
at 23 (noting that the Package removes many of the prohibitions regarding general and
politically motivated strikes and lockouts, which were introduced by the 1980 Coup in
the 1982 Constitution and arguing that general and politically motivated strikes and
lockouts are considered part of human rights in developed democracies).
150. Law No. 5982, art. 8 (providing the four paragraphs added to Article 74
concerning the right to petition and the establishment of the Ombudsman Office);
POLICY BRIEF, supra note 11, at 13 (comparing the language of Article 74 in the 1982
Constitution, translated into English, to the language offered by the Package, including
the new language regarding the Ombudsman).
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the Ombudsman,” and four paragraphs have been added.151
The only change regarding the right to information and appeal
is in the third paragraph, which states: “Everyone has the right
to information and apply to ombudsman [sic].”152 The revisions
to Article 74 are especially significant because they establish an
independent ombudsman to investigate and review the actions
of the administration and their conformity with the law.153
Institutions such as the Ombudsman Office, which are
independent from the administrative and legislative bodies, have
been welcomed and supported by the United Nations Human
Rights Committee.154 The additions propose that the
Ombudsman’s Office be subordinate to the TBMM Presidency
and that the Chief Ombudsman be elected for four year terms
by the TBMM.155

151. Law No. 5982, art. 8 (providing the changes made to Article 74); see POLICY
BRIEF, supra note 11, at 13 (noting in English the differences between the Constitution
and the Package proposal, including the consolidated title of the Article: “Right to
Petition, Right to Information and Appeal to the Ombudsman”).
152. See Law No. 5982, art. 8 (providing the changes made to Article 74 in
Turkish); POLICY BRIEF, supra note 11, at 13 (noting that, as translated in English, the
phrase “The way of exercising this right shall be determined by law” in the Constitution
is replaced by “[e]veryone has the right to information and apply to ombudsman
[sic].” The remaining changes are regarding the organization and functions of the
Ombudsman Office.); ENSAROĞLU, supra note 60, at 26 (describing the right to
information as an important component of freedom of expression).
153. See Law No. 5982, art. 8 (noting the amendment to Article 74 in its original
language); see also POLICY BRIEF, supra note 11, at 6 (“Everyone has the right to
information and [to] apply to [the] Ombudsman.”); ENSAROĞLU, supra note 60, at 26
(discussing the benefits of the Ombudsman Office).
154. See ENSAROĞLU, supra note 60, at 26 (stating that the United National
Human Rights Committee has been very supportive of institutions that are established
by governments but function independently). See generally TASAM, supra note 127
(depicting the Ombudsman structure in numerous European states, which sets forth
that the Ombudsman be elected by the Parliament and arguing that the term of office
set forth in the Package should be twelve years).
155. See Law No. 5982, art. 8 (noting the amendment to Article 74 in its original
language); see also POLICY BRIEF, supra note 11, at 13 (“The Ombudsman Office
established subordinate to the Presidency of the Turkish Grand National Assembly
investigates the complaints related with the operation of the administration.”);
TASAM, supra note 127 (noting that the Ombudsman’s term of office is matched to the
new legislative year, which constitutes an obstacle for a completely independent
Ombudsman Office. In addition, unlike in European states, where the Ombudsman
undertakes investigations on behalf of the Parliament, the proposed language
subordinates the Ombudsman Office to the TBMM Presidency.).
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5. Article 9: TBMM Membership
Article 9 of the Package removes the last paragraph of
Article 84 in the pre-amendment 1982 Constitution, which
effects the termination of membership of deputies in the
TBMM.156 The amendment repeals the deprivation of
membership for deputies whose actions resulted in the closure
of their parties, rendering this provision consistent with the
European Convention on Human Rights (“Convention”) and
the case law of the European Court of Human Rights
(“ECHR”).157 The deleted portion from the amended 1982
Constitution called for the termination of the “membership of a
deputy whose statements and acts are cited in a final judgment
by the Constitutional Court as having caused the permanent
dissolution of his party.”158 Even though general statements and
actions by TBMM members are protected under legislative nonliability, the Constitutional Court has in the past repeatedly

156. Law No. 5982, art. 9 (indicating the amended version of Article 84, which
removed a stipulation from the 1982 Constitution that rescinded a deputy’s
membership in the TBMM if his statements and acts were cited in a final judgment by
the Constitutional Court as having caused the permanent dissolution of his party); see
POLICY BRIEF, supra note 11, at 5, 14 (comparing the pre-amendment language of
Article 84 to the one proposed in the Package).
157. See Law No. 5982, art. 9 (indicating the language that would be repealed
from Article 84 of the 1982 Constitution); see also POLICY BRIEF, supra note 11, at 6
(“The revision to Article 84 repeals the deprivation of MP status for those whose
actions lead to the closure of their parties.”); ENSAROĞLU, supra note 60, at 32 (stating
that the existing language of Article 84 is inconsistent with international human rights
law). In the past, the ECHR has repeatedly decided that the regulations in the Turkish
Constitution regarding political bans and loss of TBMM membership violate Article 3
of the Protocol No. 1 of the Convention concerning the right to elect and be elected.
ENSAROĞLU, supra note 60, at 32. See generally Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 11, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (depicting
the standards for freedom of assembly and association); Protocol No. 1 to the
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 3,
Mar. 20, 1952, 213 U.N.T.S. 262 (agreeing to the right to free elections that ensures the
free expression of opinion in the contracting states).
158. Law No. 5982, art. 9 (providing the proposed language to be removed from
Article 84); POLICY BRIEF, supra note 11, at 16 (comparing the language of Article 125
in the 1982 Constitution, as it would be if translated into English, to the amended one
proposed in the 2010 Package). But see TASAM, supra note 127 (arguing that the
revisions are pointless as Article 84 in the 1982 Constitution already avails TBMM
members of the benefits of legislative non-liability for their statements and waives them
of criminal and statutory prosecution).
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based its ban decisions on the statements and sanctions of
TBMM members of that party.159
6. Article 11: Recourse to Judicial Review
Article 11 of the Package revises Article 125 of the preamendment 1982 Constitution.160 Together with the changes
made to Articles 145, 156, and 157, these changes aim to reform
the military judiciary.161 The changes suggested in Article 11
would make the decisions of Yüksek Askeri Şura (“YAŞ”)
[Supreme Military Council] regarding the expulsion of military
officers from the Turkish Armed Forces subject to judicial
review.162 Nevertheless, the new draft makes no exception for
YAŞ decisions concerning promotion procedures and
retirement due to a shortage of cadres.163 Another change in
Article 125 is in the fourth paragraph where the consolidated
version adds the following: “Judicial power shall be limited to
control of the lawfulness of administrative actions and

159. See TASAM, supra note 127 (noting that prosecuting a political party for the
statements or actions of its members has been used as a basis in political party ban
decisions in Turkey, a practice that is not sanctioned under international human rights
law); see, e.g., supra note 96 (quoting the Constitutional Court decision regarding the
closure of the FP [Virtue Party], which was based on the acts and statements of some of
its members).
160. Law No. 5982, art. 11 (providing the language added to Article 125 in the
amendment package regarding recourse to judicial review); see POLICY BRIEF, supra
note 11, at 8 (“According to amended Article 125, judicial remedies will be available
against the decisions of the Supreme Military Council regarding discharges of any kind,
except for decisions regarding promotion procedures and retirement due to shortage
of cadres.”).
161. See Law No. 5982, arts. 11, 15, 20, 21 (providing the changes made to Article
125, 145, 156, and 157 regarding military courts); TASAM, supra note 127 (analyzing
each article amended in the 2010 reform package).
162. See Law No. 5982, art. 11 (providing proposed changes to Article 125
regarding judicial remedies against certain decisions made by Yüksek Askeri Şura
(“YAŞ”)); POLICY BRIEF, supra note 11, at 16 (noting the contrast between the language
of Article 125 in the 1982 Constitution and the reform offered regarding this article in
the Package).
163. See Law No. 5982, art. 11 (noting the language of amended Article 125,
which makes an exception for YAŞ decisions concerning certain promotions and
retirements); POLICY BRIEF, supra note 11, at 16 (translating into English and providing
a comparison between the language in the 1982 Constitution and the Package).
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procedures and shall under no circumstance be used as the
control of expediency.”164
7. Article 14: Judicial Oversight
Article 14 of the Package completely modifies Article 144 of
the pre-amendment 1982 Constitution regarding the supervision
of judges and public prosecutors.165 It renames Article 144 “The
Inspection of the Judicial Services” and proposes that the public
prosecutors proceed in the following way: “The inspection of
judicial services and the administrative duties of public
prosecutors by the Ministry of Justice shall be conducted by
judicial inspectors and internal auditors, who should be a judge
or a prosecutor by profession. Whereas examination, inquiry,
and investigation procedures shall be conducted by judicial
inspectors.”166
8. Article 15: Military Justice
Article 15 of the Package revises Article 145 of the preamendment 1982 Constitution regarding military justice.167 The
powers granted to military justice have been modified by each
Turkish Constitution.168 Under the 1961 Constitution the
jurisdiction of military justice was broadened and the Military
Court of Cassation was established as the final reviewing
164. Law No. 5982, art. 11 (reflecting the amended language of Article 125); see
also POLICY BRIEF, supra note 11, at 16 (illustrating the English translation of Article
125’s original and amended version).
165. Law No. 5982, art. 14 (providing a completely revised Article 144 of the 1982
Constitution); see POLICY BRIEF, supra note 11, at 7 (translating Article 14 of the
Package into English: “With the proposals on Article 144 and 159, the composition and
the expansion of the HCJP [High Council for Judges and Public Prosecutors] are
restructured to include a broader representation of judicial officials”).
166. Law No. 5982, art. 14 (reflecting the amended language of Article 144); see
also POLICY BRIEF, supra note 11, at 18 (illustrating the English translation of Article
144’s original and amended version).
167. Law No. 5982, art. 15 (stating the language of amended Article 145 including
the three revised paragraphs regarding the jurisdiction of military justice); see POLICY
BRIEF, supra note 11, at 7 (summarizing the revisions to military justice, which included
amendments to Articles 125, 145, 156, and 157).
168. See Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Anayasası July 20, 1961, art. 141 (Turk.) (providing
the Turkish version of Article 141, which established the Military Court of Cassation
and noting that it was amended in 1971); see also ENSAROĞLU, supra note 60, at 42
(noting that the Military Court of Cassation was established by Article 141 in the 1961
Constitution, which was amended in 1971 after the second coup).
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authority for decisions made by military courts and certain
decisions in state courts rendered against military officials.169
The 1971 amendments added the High Military Administrative
Court of Appeals to military courts as a parallel to the civilian
Council of State, which created a dual court system inconsistent
with the principles of a democratic constitutional state.170 The
1982 Constitution strengthened the authority of military courts
and expanded the jurisdiction of the High Military
Administrative Court of Appeals.171
The revision to Article 145, envisages limitations on the
expanded jurisdiction of military courts to try military personnel
only for military offenses.172 The new draft, while continuing to
grant jurisdiction to military courts to “handle cases regarding
military offences committed by military personnel and offences
committed by military personnel against military personnel or
related to their military services or duties,” stipulates that
military personnel’s “offences against the security of the state,
constitutional order and the functioning of this order shall be
handled in judicial courts.”173 In addition, the new draft removes

169. See supra note 60 and accompanying text (discussing the establishment of the
Military Court of Cassation in the 1961 Constitution and the increasing power of
military justice in the following constitutions); see also ENSAROĞLU, supra note 60, at 42
(stating that the 1971 amendments established the High Military Administrative Court
of Appeals).
170. See ENSAROĞLU, supra note 60, at 42 (providing the historical context of
military justice, specifically the dual court system created by the 1961 Constitution and
1971 amendments and noting that the expansion of military jurisdiction to the
detriment of the judiciary led to the adjudication of military personnel and civilians in
different court systems.); see also POLICY BRIEF, supra note 11, at 7 (comparing the preamendment language of Article 145 to the revised text).
171. See Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Anayasası Nov. 7, 1982, arts. 145, 156–157 (Turk.)
(showing how the 1982 Constitution amended the articles regarding military justice);
see also ENSAROĞLU, supra note 60, at 42 (providing the constitutional context of
military justice in the 1961 and 1982 Constitutions and 1971 amendments). The
existence of a military justice system is problematic in terms of human rights and
democracy. In constitutional states (states of law), civilians cannot be heard in military
courts and military court decisions must be reviewed by civilian high courts. See
ENSAROĞLU, supra note 60, at 42.
172. See Law No. 5982, art. 15 (noting the language of amended Article 145); see
also POLICY BRIEF, supra note 11, at 7 (“The amended Article 145 limits the competence
of the military judiciary to the handling of military offences.”).
173. Law No. 5982, art. 15 (reflecting the amended language of Article 145);
POLICY BRIEF, supra note 11, at 18 (illustrating the English translation of Article 145’s
original and amended version); see ENSAROĞLU, supra note 60, at 43 (stating that the
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the term, “in military places.”174 Finally, the last sentence in the
article concerning the “[r]elations between military judges and
the office of commander . . . regarding the requirements of
military service apart from judicial functions, shall also be
prescribed by law” is no longer in the text.175
The new draft removes the term, “or under martial law”
from the list in the second paragraph, which stipulates that the
organization of “offenses and persons falling within the
jurisdiction of military courts in time of war” and “the
appointment of judges and public prosecutors from judicial
courts to military courts shall be regulated by law.”176 Whereas
the pre-amendment 1982 Constitution allowed non-military
persons to be tried in military courts in times of war or under
martial law, the consolidated version of the article limits this
only to times of war.177
9. Article 16: Organization of the Constitutional Court
Article 16 of the Package revises Article 146 of the preamendment 1982 Constitution regarding the size and

amendments in Article 145 provide the adjudication in state courts for offences against
the security of the state, constitutional order and the functioning of this order).
174. Law No. 5982, art. 15 (noting the language of amended Article 145 in
Turkish); POLICY BRIEF, supra note 11, at 18 (delineating the differences between
Article 145 of the 1982 Constitution and the Package in an English translation); see
ENSAROĞLU, supra note 60, at 43 (arguing that by removing “in military places” the
revisions further restrict the military courts’ jurisdiction).
175. Law No. 5982, art. 15 (noting the language of amended Article 145 in
Turkish); POLICY BRIEF, supra note 11, at 18 (illustrating the English translation of
Article 145’s original and amended version. “The amended Article 145 limits the
competence of the military judiciary to the handling of military offences.”).
176. Law No. 5982, art. 15 (noting the language of amended Article 145 in
Turkish); POLICY BRIEF, supra note 11, at 18 (providing the language that has been
removed from the 1982 Constitution); see ENSAROĞLU, supra note 60, at 42 (stating that
the amended Article 145 as proposed in the Package limits the jurisdiction of military
courts); TASAM, supra note 127 (noting the consequences of martial law with regards
to shift in powers from civilian to military bureaucracy and the adjudication of offenses
in relation to the reasons of martial law by military courts).
177. See Law No. 5982, art. 15 (noting the language of amended Article 145 in
Turkish); POLICY BRIEF, supra note 11, at 18 (“Non-military persons shall not be tried in
military courts excluding the state of war.”). According to the pre-amendment
constitution, civilians can be tried in military courts in times of martial law. See TASAM,
supra note 127.
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membership of the Constitutional Court.178 The 1982
Constitution stipulated an eleven-member Constitutional Court,
whose membership would be decided directly or indirectly by
presidential appointment.179 The revisions put forward in Article
16 of the Package would increase the membership of the
Constitutional Court to seventeen members, and permit the
TBMM to elect three of those members.180 Furthermore, the
proposal regulates the appointments to the Court made by the
President, while requiring two such appointments to be made
from among military court judges.181 Moreover, Article 16 sets
the minimum age requirement for Constitutional Court
members at forty-five, increases the experience requirement for
category one judges and prosecutors from fifteen to twenty years
and makes way for court rapporteurs to become Constitutional
Court members.182
10. Article 17: Constitutional Court Membership
Article 17 of the Package amends Article 147 of the preamendment 1982 Constitution, which discusses the termination

178. Law No. 5982, art. 16 (stipulating the five paragraphs added to amended
Article 146 in the Package); POLICY BRIEF, supra note 11, at 19 (comparing the
language of Article 146 in the 1982 Constitution to the one in the Package).
179. Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Anayasasi Nov. 7, 1982, art. 146 (Turk.) (stipulating an
eleven-member Constitutional Court); see Law No. 5982, art. 16 (providing the
consolidated version of Article 146 in the Package, which requires a [seventeen]member Constitutional Court).
180. Law No. 5982, art. 16 (providing the consolidated version of Article 146
which requires a seventeen-member Constitutional Court); POLICY BRIEF, supra note
11, at 19 (“The Constitutional Court shall be composed of seventeen members.”);
ENSAROĞLU, supra note 60, at 45 (arguing that in democratic states political powers and
parliaments play a significant role in the election of Constitutional Court members).
The 1961 Constitution allowed the TBMM to elect Constitutional Court members, an
authority that was taken away by the changes implemented after the 1971 Coup. See
ENSAROĞLU, supra note 60, at 45.
181. See Law No. 5982, art. 16 (providing the consolidated version of Article 146
which sets forth the organization of the Constitutional Court); POLICY BRIEF, supra note
11, at 19 (providing in English the newly added language regarding the appointment
of Constitutional Court members by the TBMM and the President).
182. Law No. 5982, art. 16 (providing the consolidated version of Article 146
which sets forth the age and experience requirements for the Court members); see
ENSAROĞLU, supra note 60, at 44 (noting the radical changes to the organization of the
Constitutional Court).
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of Constitutional Court membership.183 The additions to Article
147 introduce a limited term of office for the Constitutional
Court: “[t]he members of the Constitutional Court . . . [shall]
be elected for a term of twelve years. A member shall not be reelected.”184 In addition, the proposed version maintains the
retirement age of sixty-five as stipulated in the pre-amendment
1982 Constitution.185 “The appointment of the members to
another office whose term of office expires prior to their
mandatory age of retirement and matters regarding their
personal rights shall be laid down in law.”186
11. Article 18: Functions and Powers of the Constitutional Court
Article 18 of the Package revises Article 148 of the preamendment 1982 Constitution regarding the functions and
powers of the Constitutional Court.187 The revisions to Article
148 introduce the right of individuals to apply to the
Constitutional Court, allow the Court to act as the Supreme
Court, and pave the way for appeals of decisions made by the
Court while acting in its capacity as the Supreme Court.188
183. Law No. 5982, art. 17 (noting the additions to amended Article 147 including
the language regarding the term of office of Constitutional Court members); POLICY
BRIEF, supra note 11, at 20 (comparing, in an English translation, Article 147 of the
1982 Constitution to the suggested language in Article 17 of the Package).
184. Law No. 5982, art. 17 (providing the consolidated version of Article 147
which sets forth the term of office of Constitutional Court members and the
termination of their memberships); POLICY BRIEF, supra note 11, at 20 (comparing
Article 147 of the pre-amendment 1982 Constitution to the suggested language in
Article 17 of the Package); see TASAM, supra note 127 (arguing that twelve years are
sufficient for a judge to gain experience and at the same time allow the Court to reflect
social changes in its profile and stipulating that in many European courts the term of
office for judges is between nine to twelve years).
185. Law No. 5982, art. 17 (reflecting the suggested language of Article 147 as
proposed in the Package, in Turkish); POLICY BRIEF, supra note 11, at 20 (stating in
English the suggested change to Article 147 of the 1982 Constitution: “[t]he members
of the Constitutional Court shall retire on reaching the age of sixty-five”).
186. Law No. 5982, art. 17 (providing the consolidated version of Article 147,
which sets forth the term of office of Constitutional Court members); POLICY BRIEF,
supra note 11, at 20 (comparing, in English, Article 147 of the pre-amendment 1982
Constitution to the suggested language in Article 17 of the Package).
187. Law No. 5982, art. 18 (noting the additions to amended Article 148
regarding the functions and powers of the Constitutional Court); POLICY BRIEF, supra
note 11, at 20–21 (comparing the language of Article 148 in the 1982 Constitution to
the amended language, as translated).
188. See Law No. 5982, art. 18 (noting the revisions made to Article 148 of the
1982 Constitution including applications to the Constitutional Court ); POLICY BRIEF,
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According to the third paragraph of the amended version of
Article 148, “[a]nyone, who claims that any of their fundamental
rights and freedoms guaranteed under the Constitution and
falling under the European Convention of Human Rights has
been violated by the public authorities, can apply to the
Constitutional Court.”189 Nevertheless, the consolidated version
requires the individual to have exhausted “all ordinary legal
remedies” prior to bringing his claim before the Court.190 A
critical change in the new version of the article allows “[t]he
Chief of Staff, the commanders of the Land, Air, Naval and
Gendarmerie Forces . . . [to] be tried before the Supreme Court
for their offences related to their duties.”191 In such an event,
the Constitutional Court shall act in its capacity as the Supreme
Court.192 Prior to the Package such cases were adjudicated in
Military Court of Cassation.193
Another revision introduced under the revised version of
Article 148 pertains to the judicial review of the decisions made
supra note 11, at 6 (providing a translation of the proposal in Article 18 of the Package:
“With the amendment to Article 148, the rights of individual recourse to the
Constitutional Court is introduced. . . . [Military commanders] can be tried for
offences related to their duties by the Constitutional Court in its capacity as the
Supreme Court”).
189. Law No. 5982, art. 18 (indicating the addition to Article 148); POLICY BRIEF,
supra note 11, at 20 (comparing the pre-amendment language of Article 148 to the
suggested version in the Package, in English).
190. Law No. 5982, art. 18 (reflecting the changes to Article 148 in Turkish);
POLICY BRIEF, supra note 11, at 20 (comparing in English the pre-amendment language
of Article 148 to the suggested version in the Package).
191. Law No. 5982, art. 18 (stipulating amendments to Article 148); POLICY BRIEF,
supra note 11, at 20 (reflecting a translation of the additional paragraph suggested in
the Package regarding the trial of military commanders for offences related to their
duties); see ENSAROĞLU, supra note 60, at 47 (stating that the existing legislation lacked
to regulate the adjudication of the TBMM President, the Chief of Staff, the
commanders of Land, Air, Naval, and Gendarmerie Forces for their offences related to
their duties). This Article removes the uncertainty and grants the Constitutional Court
acting as the Supreme Court the authority to adjudicate such cases. ENSAROĞLU, supra
note 60, at 47.
192. See Law No. 5982, art. 18 (noting the functions of the Constitutional Court as
proposed under the Package); POLICY BRIEF, supra note 11, at 21 (providing an English
translation of the 1982 Constitution in contrast with the Package proposal: “[B]y the
Constitutional Court in its capacity as the Supreme Court”).
193. See TASAM, supra note 127 (stating that normally, cases against the TBMM
President, the Chief of Staff, the commanders of Land, Air, Naval and Gendarmerie
Forces for their offences related to their duties have been brought to Military Court of
Cassation); see also ENSAROĞLU, supra note 60, at 47 (stating that the existing legislation
lacked to regulate such cases).
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by the Constitutional Court acting as the Supreme Court.194 The
amended 1982 Constitution holds the judgments of the
Supreme Court to be final decisions for the matter in question,
whereas the consolidated version of the article allows for
“[a]pplications for judicial review . . . against the decisions of
the Supreme Court.”195 The new draft perceives the “[d]ecisions
taken by the plenary assembly regarding th[e] application . . .
[to] be final.”196
12. Article 19: Functioning and Trial Procedure of the
Constitutional Court
Article 19 of the reform Package is the last amended article
regarding the organization of the Constitutional Court.197 It
revises Article 149 of the pre-amendment 1982 Constitution
regarding the functioning and trial procedure of the Court.198
The consolidated version introduces a quorum for the
Constitutional Court to convene and increases the minimum
number of votes required to close a political party, deprive it
from government aid, or annul constitutional amendments, to
two-thirds of the total number of parliamentary members.199 In

194. See Law No. 5982, art. 18 (noting the changes made to the eighth paragraph
of the amended Article 148 regarding applications for judicial review against the
decisions of the Supreme Court); see also POLICY BRIEF, supra note 11, at 21 (comparing
Article 148 in the 1982 Constitution to the amended language of Article 148).
195. Law No. 5982, art. 18 (noting the language of the proposed Article 148 in
Turkish); POLICY BRIEF, supra note 11, at 21 (comparing Article 148 in the 1982
Constitution, as it would appear in English, to the amended language of Article 148
proposed by Article 18 in the Package).
196. Law No. 5982, art. 18 (reflecting the amended language of Article 148 in
Turkish); POLICY BRIEF, supra note 10, at 21 (comparing an English version of Article
148 of the 1982 Constitution to the suggested language proposed by Article 19 of the
Package).
197. See Law No. 5982, art. 19 (noting the five paragraphs added to amended
Article 149 regarding the functions and powers of the Constitutional Court); POLICY
BRIEF, supra note 11, at 21–22 (comparing Article 149 in the 1982 Constitution to the
amended language proposed in the Package—as translated into English).
198. Law No. 5982, art. 19 (noting the revisions made to Article 149 regarding the
functions and powers of the Constitutional Court); POLICY BRIEF, supra note 11, at 21–
22 (comparing Article 149 in the 1982 Constitution to the amended language
proposed in Article 19 of the Package).
199. Law No. 5982, art. 19 (noting the revisions made to Article 149 by the
Package, including those regarding the General Assembly conventions, political party
closure and deprivation cases, and the organization of the Constitutional Court); see
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the 1982 Constitution, a three-fifths majority was required to
make those decisions.200 The amended article also stipulates task
sharing within the Constitutional Court by requiring the
General Assembly of the Court to carry out “[c]ases and
applications, annulment and appeal cases related with political
parties, as well as trials where it acts as the Supreme Court,” and
providing that the Chambers of the Court handle the individual
applications.201
13. Article 20: Military Court of Cassation
Article 20 of the Package amends Article 156 of the preamendment 1982 Constitution, which regulates the Military
Court of Cassation.202 The organization and functioning of the
Military Court of Cassation remains to be regulated by law, yet,
the requirement that the regulation be in accordance “with the
requirements of military service” is removed in the new draft.203
14. Article 21: High Military Administrative Court
Article 21 of the Package reforms Article 157 of the preamendment 1982 Constitution regarding the High Military
Administrative Court of Appeals.204 The new draft removes the
POLICY BRIEF, supra note 11, at 21 (comparing Article 149 in the 1982 Constitution to
the amended language suggested in Article 19 of the Package).
200. Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Anayasası Nov. 7, 1982, art. 149 (Turk.) (indicating the
voting requirement for decisions of Constitutional amendments and closure or
deprivation of political parties in the 1982 Constitution); see also Law No. 5982, art. 19
(noting the amended language of Article 149 in Turkish); Policy Brief, supra note 11, at
21 (quoting Article 19 of the Package proposal in English: “The decision of annulment
of Constitutional amendments and closure or the deprivation of the political parties
from Government aid shall be taken by two-thirds of the total number of members.”).
201. Law No. 5982, art. 19 (reflecting the amended language of Article 149 in
Turkish); POLICY BRIEF, supra note 11, at 21 (comparing Article 149 in the 1982
Constitution, in English, to the amended language proposed by Article 19).
202. Law No. 5982, art. 20 (noting the final paragraph added to Article 156 of the
amended 1982 Constitution regarding the regulation of the organization and
functioning of the Military High Court of Appeals); POLICY BRIEF, supra note 11, at 22
(comparing the language of Article 156 in the 1982 Constitution to the amended
language proposed in Article 20 of the Package).
203. Law No. 5982, art. 20 (reflecting the amended language of Article 156 in
Turkish); POLICY BRIEF, supra note 11, at 22 (quoting the language of amended Article
156 in English).
204. Law No. 5982, art. 21 (noting the final paragraph added to Article 157
regarding the regulation of the organization and functioning of the High Military
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requirement that the organization and functioning of the Court
“be regulated by law in accordance with . . . the security of
tenure of judges within the requirements of military service.”205
15. Article 22: Organization of the HSYK
Article 22 of the draft revises Article 159 of the preamendment 1982 Constitution regarding the restructuring of
the HSYK.206 It is the most extensively edited article and makes
one of the most controversial changes to the 1982
Constitution.207 It proposes a significant increase in the number
of HSYK members from seven to twenty-two regular members
and twelve substitute members, who are to perform their duties
in three chambers.208 According to the amended language of
Article 159, the president of the HSYK continues to be the
Minister of Justice, while the Undersecretary to the Minister of
Justice continues to serve as an ex-officio member.209 While
Administrative Court); POLICY BRIEF, supra note 11, at 23 (comparing the language of
Article 157 in the 1982 Constitution to the language in Article 21 of the Package).
205. Law No. 5982, art. 21 (emphasis added); see POLICY BRIEF, supra note 11, at
23 (comparing the language of Article 157 in the 1982 Constitution, as translated, to
the language suggested by Article 21 of the Package); ENSAROĞLU, supra note 60, at 42
(stating that the amended language of Article 157 in the Package limits the jurisdiction
of military courts).
206. Law No. 5982, art. 22 (noting the eleven paragraphs added to Article 159
regarding the HSYK); POLICY BRIEF, supra note 11, at 24–25 (comparing the language
of Article 159 in the 1982 Constitution to the recommended language in Article 22 of
the Package).
207. See Law No. 5982, art. 22 (illustrating the eleven newly-added paragraphs
recommended to supplant Article 159 of the 1982 Constitution regarding the HSYK);
see also POLICY BRIEF, supra note 11, at 24–25 (comparing the language of Article 159 in
the 1982 Constitution to the amended language in Article 22 of the Package); Pelin
Turgut, Turkey: A Referendum for Democracy or a Strongman?, TIME, Sept. 13, 2010,
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2018862,00.html#ixzz1ZmJI4bab
(“The most controversial of the approved reforms paves the way for political
appointments by parliament and the President to Turkey’s highest court, the
Constitutional Court and the Supreme Board of Prosecutors and Judges.”).
208. Law No. 5982, art. 22 (reflecting the amended language of Article 159
regarding the organization of the HSYK in Turkish); see also ENSAROĞLU, supra note 60,
at 50 (noting that the number of permanent HSYK members is increased from seven to
twenty-two).
209. Law No. 5982, art. 22 (reflecting the language of Article 159 in the Package);
see POLICY BRIEF, supra note 11, at 24 (“The President of the Council is the Minister of
Justice. The Undersecretary to the Minister of Justice shall be an ex-officio member of
the Council.”). This language remains the same in the amended Article 159. POLICY
BRIEF, supra note 11, at 24.
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having a member of the government in councils similar to the
HSYK is globally enforced, the lack of changes to the structure is
regarded by some legal professionals as causing a dual
representation problem.210
In the context of appointing the HSYK members, the
revised language of Article 159 sets forth that four of the twentytwo regular members “shall be appointed by the [p]resident . . .
for a term of four years from among . . . [professors of] law . . .
and lawyers.”211 The majority of the members of HSYK shall be
selected by the judges and prosecutors themselves.212 “The
members may be re-elected at the end of their term of office.”213
In addition, the consolidated version of Article 159 calls for the
establishment of a General Secretariat under the HSYK, which
shall be appointed by the President of the HSYK “from among
the three candidates, who are first category judges and public
prosecutors, proposed by the Council.”214

210. See Law No. 5982, art. 22 (reflecting the language of Article 159 in the
Package); see also ENSAROĞLU, supra note 60, at 51 (noting that while a member of the
political power acting as the head of institutions such as the HSYK is consistent with the
global enforcement, the existence of a dual representation by both the Minister of
Justice and the his Undersecretary in the HSYK is viewed as problematic by some in
legal circles); see POLICY BRIEF, supra note 11, at 24 (depicting the preserved language
regarding the Minister of Justice and the Undersecretary in the Package).
211. Law No. 5982, art. 22 (noting the language of Article 159 in the Package);
POLICY BRIEF, supra note 11, at 24 (quoting the amended language (in English) of
Article 159 in the Package).
212. Law No. 5982, art. 22. The amendment proposes the following institutions to
appoint members to the HSYK from among their own members: three regular and
three substitute members by the Plenary Assembly of the Court of Cassation, two
regular and two substitute members by the Plenary Assembly of the Council of State
and one regular and one substitute members by the Plenary Assembly of the Justice
Academy of Turkey. See id.
213. Law No. 5982, art. 22 (reflecting the language of amended Article 159 in
Turkish); POLICY BRIEF, supra note 11, at 24 (translating into English a comparison of
the changes recommended by the Package regarding the Supreme Council of Judges
and Public Prosecutors, and the original text of the 1982 Constitution).
214. Law No. 5982, art. 22; POLICY BRIEF, supra note 11, at 24 (translating into
English a comparison of the changes recommended by the Package regarding the
Supreme Council of Judges and Public Prosecutors, and the original text of the 1982
Constitution); see also HSYK Kanunu Tasarısı Kabul Edildi, HÜRRIYET (Dec. 11, 2010),
http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/ShowNew.aspx?id=16506921
[hereinafter
HSYK Kanun Tasarisi] (stating that the HSYK Draft Law, which was prepared in
accordance with the amendments to Article 159 as accepted in the referendum, passed
in the TBMM on December 11, 2010).
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The revisions to Article 159 also propose new duties for the
HSYK to carry out, such as “[t]he supervision of whether the
judges and public prosecutors . . . undertak[e] their duties in
accordance with the laws.”215 Moreover, while the preamendment 1982 Constitution holds the decisions made by the
Council as final, the Package paves the way for judicial review of
decisions regarding the removal of judges and prosecutors from
office, while continuing to prohibit appeals to other HSYK
decisions.216
16. Article 23: Economic and Social Council
Article 23 of the Package revises Article 166 of the preamendment 1982 Constitution regarding the planning of
economic development.217 This amendment establishes the
Economic and Social Council as a constitutional institution “to
provide consultative opinions to the government in the design
of economic and social policies” and guarantees its exercise,
efficiency, and participation.218 NGOs, professional chambers,
and government representatives shall gather within the Council
structure and issue consultative opinions regarding economic
and social issues.219
215. Law No. 5982, art. 22 (reflecting the language of Article 159 in the Package);
POLICY BRIEF, supra note 11, at 25 (comparing the English translations of preamendment language of the 1982 Constitution and the proposed language).
216. See Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Anayasası Nov. 7, 1982, art. 149 (Turk.); see also
POLICY BRIEF, supra note 11, at 25 (providing an English translation of proposed Article
22 of the Package: “The decisions of the Council, except for those concerning dismissal
from profession, can not be appealed at judicial bodies”).
217. Law No. 5982, art. 23 (noting the amended language of Article 166 of the
1982 Constitution regarding the Planning, Economic and Social Council); POLICY
BRIEF, supra note 11, at 26 (comparing the language of Article 166 in the 1982
Constitution, titled Planning, Economic and Social Council, to the Package).
218. Law No. 5982, art. 23 (noting the Turkish version of the proposed language
of Article 166); POLICY BRIEF, supra note 10, at 26 (reflecting the English translations of
the pre-amendment language of Article 166 and the language proposed in the
Package); see ENSAROĞLU, supra note 60, at 52 (arguing that although an existing
institution, the Economic and Social Council is now granted constitutional guarantee
and underlining the importance of organizing the Council as an independent review
mechanism that promotes domestic peace and dialog).
219. See Law No. 5982, art. 23 (noting the Turkish version of the proposed
language of Article 166); see also TASAM, supra note 127 (noting that within the
constitutional structure of the Council, different segments of the society including
NGOs, professional chambers, and government representatives, shall come together to
consult each other and issue opinions).
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17. September 12, 2010: Results and Reactions
With nearly eighty percent of the population participating
in the referendum, and fifty-eight percent voting in favor of the
Package, the AKP’s Erdoğan proclaimed victory on the evening
of September 12, 2010.220 The results signaled a three-way split
within the Turkish public; the western and southern coastal
areas voted against the Package, a majority in central Anatolia
voted for the proposal, and the Kurdish southeastern region
boycotted the referendum, with an average participation rate of
thirty-five percent.221 Prior to September 12, 2010, the main
opposition party, CHP, expressed its skepticism of the law out of
fear that the changes would undermine the independence of
the judiciary and create a “modern-day sultan” out of
Erdoğan.222 Following the referendum, one of CHP’s leaders,
Berhan Şimsek, stated that by fusing the constitutional changes
in one reform package instead of allowing the public to vote
each amendment separately, the AKP had “coated a poisonous
pill with chocolate.”223 The second opposition party, MHP,
opined that Turkey had entered into “a dark era filled with
220. See Turkey Vote Boosts PM Future, supra note 13 (indicating the referendum
results); see also Marc Champion & Joe Parkinson, Turks Pass Constitutional Changes,
WALL ST. J. (Sept. 13, 2010), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240527487
03897204575487281815955878.html (reporting Erdoğan’s statements at the AKP’s
Istanbul headquarters after preliminary vote counts: “[o]nce more it has been seen
that transformation is possible within democracy”).
221. See Villelabeitia, supra note 27 (explaining the division of votes in the 2010
Referendum); Referandum Türkiye’nin Üç Yüzünü Gösterdi, HÜRRIYET (Sept. 15, 2010,
11:37PM), http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/planet/15777404.asp (arguing that the results
have split Turkey into three).
222. Turkey Needs More Reform, European Union Says after Vote, CNN (Sept. 13, 2010)
(internal quotation marks omitted), http://articles.cnn.com/2010-09-13/world/
turkey.referendum_1_erdogan-turkish-voters-reform-package?_s=PM:WORLD
(reporting CHP’s concerns regarding the referendum as it would affect the prime
minister’s power over the judiciary); see also Ömer Taşpınar, Judicial Independence and
Democracy in Turkey, TODAY’S ZAMAN (Oct. 10, 2010), available at
http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2010/0712_turkey_democracy_taspinar.aspx
(reporting that those in opposition to the referendum perceived the Package as a step
toward undermining the independence of the judiciary).
223. Turkey Needs More Reform, European Union Says after Vote, supra note 222
(“Berhan Simsek . . . told CNN that by packaging the judicial changes with less
controversial proposals, the AKP had ‘coated a poisonous pill with chocolate.’”); see also
Turkey’s Top Court Accepts Main Opposition’s Appeal for Cancellation of Gvt-Backed
Constitutional Amendment, TURKISHPRESS.COM (June 9, 2010) [hereinafter Turkey’s Top
Court], http://www.turkishpress.com/news.asp?id=352716 (reporting CHP’s skepticism
of the reform package).
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critical risks and dangers” where the accepted amendments
might foster instability, possibly leading to rebellions among
Kurdish citizens seeking their autonomy in the southeastern
regions of the country.224
Some journalists critical of the AKP’s motives compared
contemporary Turkey to revolutionary Iran of 1979, pointing to
what they saw as the AKP’s “Islamist agenda” concealed under
its liberal reform efforts.225 These journalists highlighted to the
public “early signs in the AKP’s visceral anti-American rhetoric
and its banishment of women from top posts, as well as the
arrests and firings of political rivals.”226 The consensus among
these journalists seemed to be that the majority of the voters
supporting the referendum had not read and comprehended
the articles, and voted according to their political affiliations.227
224. See Torchia, supra note 13 (quoting MHP leader, Devlet Bahceli who voiced
his concerns about the amendment package); see also HATEM ETE, NUH YILMAZ & KADİR
ÜSTÜN, SETA FOUND. FOR POLITICAL, ECON. AND SOC. RESEARCH, REPORT NO: 5,
POLICY REPORT: TURKEY’S CONSTITUTIONAL REFERENDUM OF 2010 AND INSIGHTS FOR
THE GENERAL ELECTIONS OF 2011, 11 (Feb. 2011) [hereinafter POLICY REPORT],
available at http://setav.org/public/HaberDetay.aspx?Dil=tr&hid=66186&q=turkey-sconstitutional-referendum-of-2010 (reporting that prior to the referendum, the MHP
had “claimed that the referendum was part of the ‘destruction project’ the AK Party
had started . . . and that the country would be divided if the referendum obtained a
majority favorable vote”).
225. See Soner Yalçın, İran’a Şeriat ‘Demokrasi’ ve ‘Özgürlük’ Vaatleriyle Geldi,
HÜRRIYET (Sept. 23, 2007), http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/haber.aspx?id=
7341410&yazarid=218 (comparing Turkey to pre-1979 Iran); see also Arsu & Bilefsky,
supra note 13, at A4 (observing the pro-democracy activists’ concerns about potential
power-shifting in one political direction); Turkey PM to Hold Talks on Charter Reform with
Rivals, TIMES OF OMAN, Mar. 20, 2010 (reporting some journalists’ view that the AKP
uses “liberal reform as a cover for the encroachment of religious rule”).
226. Soner Çağaptay & David Pollock, The Scary European Model: It’s Not Modern,
Liberal, or Western, NEWSWEEK (Aug. 2, 2010, 4:00AM), available at
http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2010/08/02/the-scary-europeanmodel.html; see Arsu & Bilefsky, supra note 13, at A4 (noting that “opponents of the
changes describe them as an orchestrated power grab aimed at undermining the
secular order established by . . . Atatürk”); see also Barry Rubin, Turkey’s Referendum
Doesn’t Mean Popular Support for a Regime Aligning with Iran, THE RUBIN REPORT (Sept.
25, 2010, 8:27 PM), http://rubinreports.blogspot.com/2010/09/word-on-turkishreferendum-dont-assume.html (listing the contradictory decisions of the AKP and
asserting that if it weren’t for the fear of “the provisions strengthening the regime—90
percent of Turks would have supported the proposed changes instead of just 58
percent”).
227. See Cüneyt Ülsever, Column, Ağır Mağlubiyet, HÜRRIYET (Sept. 14, 2010),
http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/haber.aspx?id=15777182&yazarid=3
(expressing the author’s disappointment, a day after the referendum, that it is
impossible for any voter to have detailed knowledge on all of the twenty-six articles and
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The view in academia seems to be divided.228 On the one
hand, those who question the amendments proposed by the
AKP, worry that it will fill the courts and the HSYK with judges
and members who stand close to the party.229 On the other
hand, some interpret the results as an indicator of a Turkish
majority opposing “the influence of the military and judiciary in
active politics,” believing that the reforms would make Turkey
more democratic and increase government accountability to the
general public.230
Journalists who sympathize with the AKP, including
columnists of the Turkish newspaper Zaman, believe that the
tension between the military and the government is not caused
by the Islamist background of the AKP, but rather by the party’s
intention to enter political areas that traditionally have been
only theoretically under governmental authority.231 In actuality,
these areas were supervised by the military.232 Therefore, as in
the case of past political parties that had been eliminated by a
coup d’état, the AKP’s interference in institutions under military
control instills a fear among secularist state elites of losing their
either completely embrace or completely reject all of them); see also note 221 and
accompanying text (discussing the three-way split among Turks in the referendum
votes).
228. See infra notes 229–30 (discussing the split within academia over the
referendum).
229. See Sabrina Tavernise & Sebnem Arsu, In Turkey, Proposed Amendments would
Marginalize Old Guard, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 2010, at A4 (reporting a professor’s fear that
the AKP will fill spots with allies). See generally HSYK Ak Parti'nin Politikaları İçin Aparat
Haline Geldi, RADIKAL, Aug. 28, 2011 (discussing that the opposition party CHP
accused the AKP of turning the HSYK into a device for its political ideology).
230. See Arsu & Bilefsky, supra note 13, at A4 (reporting the view that the
amendments will democratize Turkish politics); see also POLICY REPORT, supra note
224(stating that the referendum serves as the Turkish public’s “final say” on the issue
of democracy and paves the way for a new civilian constitution).
231. See Emre Uslu, Column, Basics of the Turkish Political System: Politics, TODAY’S
ZAMAN (July 17, 2010), http://www.sundayszaman.com/sunday/columnistDetail_
getNewsById.action?newsId=216242 (taking the view that the AKP’s delving into certain
political areas led to a civilian-military crisis); cf. Head, supra note 129 (quoting Yavuz
Baydar, a pro-AKP columnist: “[the AKP’s] very loud, aggressive, pushy . . . combative
style” caused Erdoğan to gradually lose support and face a “profound mistrust from
certain segments of the republic”).
232. See Uslu, supra note 231 (“The civilian-military crisis during the term of the
AKP government is not about their Islamist past but about their intention to influence
political areas that are under the responsibility of the government on paper but not in
practice.”); supra notes 30–34 and accompanying text (explaining the military’s
historical supervisory role over civilian politics with constituional examples)
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privileged position in the Turkish political system.233 In sum, the
AKP supporters in the media have welcomed the referendum
results as a manifestation of a request by Turkish society for a
substantial change in the system, and they have interpreted the
AKP’s victory as a vote of confidence foreshadowing a third
victory in nationwide polls.234
Following the referendum, Turkey’s European Affairs
Minister, Egemen Bağış, stated that passing the amendments
showed the Turkish people’s determination for democracy,
human rights and a market economy.235 He further analyzed
that the referendum would lead to accelerated negotiations with
the EU regarding Turkey’s application for membership.236
The majority of foreign media organizations and politicians
have welcomed the results of the referendum, while
simultaneously calling attention to the imbalance in Turkish
politics caused by the ten percent minimum popular vote
threshold that parties must receive to sit in parliament.237 In an
233. See Emre Uslu, Basics of the Turkish Political System, TODAY’S ZAMAN, July 12,
2010 (discussing the the republican elite’s fear of losing the state against their political
rivals in domestic politics); see also Uslu, supra note 231 (“The major policy decisions
are not made in the Cabinet meetings but in meetings between generals and some
members of the cabinet at the National Security Council (MGK). Military generals
consider this system a useful way of influencing politics. . . . The opposition parties treat
the MGK’s decisions as if it were divine rule.”); see, e.g., Yalçın, supra note 225
(comparing the constitutional efforts of the AKP to the Islamic Revolution of Iran in
1979 which was feared by Iranian leftists, republicans, democrats and liberals).
234. See Mümtaz’er Türköne, “Değişim” Hep Kazanacak, ZAMAN ONLINE (Sept. 16,
2010), http://www.zaman.com.tr/yazar.do?yazino=1028128 (suggesting that the
referendum results indicate the society’s strong desire for change); see also Erdogan Says
to Start Work on New Constitution, ALARABIYA.NET (Sept. 12, 2010),
http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2010/09/13/119168.html (reporting predictions
from pundits that the affirmative votes at the referendum signal that the AKP will win a
third term in government). But cf. Arsu & Bilefsky, supra note 13, at A4 (reporting
analysts’ opinions that while the margin of affirmative votes indicates the AKP’s high
chances of winning re-election, the margin is also likely to polarize the country further
entrenching ideological divides). See generally Taşpınar, supra note 222 (stating that the
results would indicate political parties’ success in the general elections of 2011).
235. See Interview by Aydin Ali Ihsan with Egemen Bağış, European Affairs
Minister, Republic of Turk., EURONEWS (Sept. 13, 2010) (reporting Turkey’s European
Affairs Minister’s reaction in the aftermath of the referendum).
236. See id. (noting Egemen Bağış’s analysis of how the referendum results would
affect Turkey’s bid to enter the EU).
237. See Coups Away, supra note 73 (discussing the reactions by non-Turkish media
and politicians to the referendum); see also Türkische Verfassungsreform International
Begrüßt, DIE PRESSE (Sept. 13, 2010), http://diepresse.com/home/politik/
aussenpolitik/594039/Tuerkische-Verfassungsreform-international-begruesst?from=
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article published in July 2010, Newsweek drew attention to a new
Turkey as the political and economic center of its own region,
“forging a new foreign policy, with itself at the very center.”238
The article alerted its readers to the mistake of seeing Turkey
either “‘with’ the EU and U.S., or ‘with’ the Muslim world or
Russia” since the “new, strongly Turkey-centered policy” of the
country encompasses all of these positions.239 In a second
Newsweek article, it was acknowledged that the results of the
referendum could lead to a remaking of Turkey in Erdoğan’s
image, turning away from the country’s traditional Western
allies and joining “forces . . . with anti-US hardliners in the
Middle East,” a development that gives the US government the
“jitters.”240
Overall, however, spectators outside of Turkey have
welcomingly received the referendum results as progress toward
a more democratic Turkey in line with EU expectations.241 A
statement from US President Barack Obama, acknowledged the
referendum outcome as illustrative of the “vibrancy of Turkey’s
democracy.”242 Joost Lagendijk, a former European MP, stated
that Europeans, “despite sharing some of the criticism on the
details,” backed the Package.243 EU Commissioner Stefan Fuele
agreed with his colleague’s comments by applauding the
amendments as “a step in the right direction” and a

suche.intern.portal (reporting that the referendum results in Turkey were welcomed
internationally); Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of State, supra note 9 (“To participate in the
distribution of seats, a party must obtain at least 10% of the votes cast at the national
level . . . .”).
238. Owen Matthews, Ankara in the Middle, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 2, 2010.
239. Id.
240. Matthews, supra note 16 (explaining US concerns regarding the effects of the
referendum).
241. See infra note 242–47 and accompanying text (summarizing the reactions by
non-Turkish media and political circles); see also Türkische Verfassungsreform International
Begrüßt, supra note 237 (discussing the international response to the referendum
results, including statements made by the US President, the German Foreign Minister,
and EU officials).
242. Referendum in Turkey, BUSINESS RECORDER (Pak.), Sept. 15, 2010 (quoting
President Barack Obama in his reaction to Turkey’s referendum results); Arsu &
Bilefsky, supra note 13, at A4 (reporting a statement released by US President Barack
Obama referring to the 2010 referendum as an illustration of “the vibrancy of Turkey’s
democracy”).
243. Turgut, supra note 9 (quoting a statement mady by Joost Lagendijk in the
Radikal).
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manifestation of Turkey’s commitment to join the EU.244
Nevertheless, Fuele added that Turkey had a long path in front
of it and needed to implement further reforms “to address the
remaining priorities [such as those] in the area of fundamental
rights.”245 Foreign Ministers of Finland, Germany, and the
United Kingdom have also remarked on the constitutional
referendum results and called for more momentum.246 While
Germany and France have been long-term opponents of
Turkey’s EU membership, the Finnish foreign minister made
highly supportive statements: “Only by having a seat at the table
will Turkey be able to contribute fully to the security and
prosperity of the EU’s member states.”247
III. ANALYSIS OF THE AMENDMENT PACKAGE
Part III examines the Package in two sections. Section A
encompasses articles that revise the fundamental rights and
freedoms and economic rights and duties of citizens, and
Section B discusses the articles that amend the structure and
organization of the judiciary. This Part analyzes only those
revisions that pose significant consequences to the EU accession
process or the balancing of certain powers in Turkish politics.
A. Fundamental Rights and Freedoms & Economic Rights and Duties
By emphasizing the importance of the individual, the
amendments regarding fundamental rights and freedoms seek
to produce a more liberal and rights-based approach in the

244. EU Welcomes Turkey Referendum Victory, FINANCIAL MIRROR, Sept. 13, 2010.
245. Id.
246. Joanna Sopinska, EU/Turkey: EU Welcomes Constitutional Reforms, Urges Ankara
to Go Further, EUROPOLITICS, Sept. 13, 2010 (“While the UK and Finland argued for the
acceleration of the accession talks, others led by Germany advocated building closer
ties outside the framework of Ankara’s EU membership bid.”); see also German Minister
Urges ‘Fair Treatment’ of Turkey in EU Accession Process, BBC, Sept. 14, 2010 (quoting
German Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle: “[The referendum] showed that Turkey
[is] orienting itself towards Europe.”).
247. Sopinska, supra note 246 (quoting Finland’s Foreign Minister); see also
German, French Leaders Stand United against Turkey, TODAY’S ZAMAN (May 12, 2009)
(reporting that as longtime opponents to Turkey’s EU bid, leaders of Germany and
France reiterated their stance against Turkey’s EU membership).

2011]

TURKEY: CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM

333

relationship between Turkish citizens and the state.248 These
portions in the Package particularly provide greater freedom
and opportunity for women and minorities in Turkish society
and improve the protection of constitutional rights and
liberties.249
For example, the amendment to Article 10 broadens the
group of citizens that can benefit from the principle of equality
by including children, elderly, disabled, and widows and
orphans of martyrs as well as for invalid and veterans in the
list.250 By adding these individuals to the group of protected
citizens, the Package broadens the scope of the meaning of
equality, which constitutes the foundational element of human
rights.251
The changes made to Article 53 of the amended 1982
Constitution entitle civil servants and other government officials
to collective bargaining and collective agreement rights, but fall
short of granting them the right to strike.252 As such, the
amended Constitution presents civil servants and public officials
as a party vis-à-vis the state, instead of treating them as part of
the state.253 The amendments in the Package fail to define the
content and the scope of the right to collective agreement; while
they benefit pensioners by allowing them to take advantage of
collective agreement provisions.254 Even though the proposed
language falls short of effecting a dramatic change in the
Constitution, these shortcoming may be remedied with a public

248. See supra note 141 and accompanying text (discussing how the amendments
are grouped throughout this Comment).
249. See supra note 141 and accompanying text (noting that the first group of
amendments relate to fundamental rights and freedoms).
250. See supra note 142 and accompanying text (citing the language of the
Article 1 of the Package, proposed to reform Article 10 of the 1982 Constitution, and
affecting equality for women and minority groups).
251. See supra note 142 and accompanying text (reflecting the changes in the
language including the list of protected citizens added to the revised Article 10).
252. See supra notes 144–46 and accompanying text (discussing Article 6 of the
Package, which revises Article 53 of the amended 1982 Constitution).
253. See supra notes 144–46 and accompanying text (introducing the revised
language that grants civil servants and public officials the right to conclude collective
agreements with the government).
254. See supra note 145 and accompanying text (discussing Article 6 of the
Package, which introduces collective agreement rights to public officials and
pensioners).
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administration reform that will be drafted in accordance with
the Package and include the right to strike.255
Changes made to Article 54 regarding the right to strike
and lockout remove the third paragraph concerning union
liability for any damages caused during strikes.256 Previously,
Article 54 guaranteed secure workplaces in response to union
efforts to keep the premises damage-free.257 The Package lifts
the unions’ responsibility, which may lead to an incentive for
unions to utilize their right to strike or it may render individual
employees liable and thus severely weaken the effective use of
the right to strike.258 In addition, the deletion of the seventh
paragraph regarding the prohibition of political strikes,
lockouts, and go-slows must be viewed as a step toward a more
liberal constitution.259 By removing the list of actions that have
been identified with the events leading to the 1980 Coup, the
proponents of the Package aim to obliterate the traces of a
period many Turks regret.260.
The changes to Article 74 broaden the right to legal
remedies by introducing a constitutional right to information
and to petition to the Ombudsman Office, which shall be
established to review the operations of the administration.261
Although the revised Article 74 is a step supported by the global
human rights organization, there remain concerns regarding
some aspects of the Ombudsman Office as introduced in the

255. See supra notes 144–46 and accompanying text (noting the changes
introduced in the consolidated version of Article 53 that allows parties to appeal to the
Conciliation Board of Public Servants).
256. See supra notes 147–48 and accompanying text (discussing Article 7 of the
Package, which revises Article 54 of the amended 1982 Constitution).
257. See supra note 148 and accompanying text (reflecting the repealed portion of
Article 54 that held labor unions liable for any damage caused in work places during
strikes).
258. See supra note 147 and accompanying text (noting that the deleted language
removed strike and lockout prohibitions introduced by the 1980 Coup).
259. See supra notes 148–49 and accompanying text (noting that general and
politically motivated strikes are considered human rights in developed countries).
260. See supra notes 64–71 and accompanying text (summarizing the social and
political events in Turkey between 1971 and 1980).
261. See supra notes 150–53 and accompanying text (stating the changes the
Package introduces with the revised language of Article 74).
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Package.262 One of those concerns is the length of the
Ombudsman’s term of office, which coincides with the new
legislative session and, therefore, does not fully guarantee the
independence of the Ombudsman Office.263 A structure that
allows for a twelve-year term, which is also the length of
Constitutional Court memberships, may guarantee a more
autonomous institution.264 In addition, the Ombudsman Office
is organized as subordinate to the TBMM Presidency which is a
structure inconsistent with EU procedures.265 In order for it to
serve as an autonomous institution and to avoid future legal
issues, the Ombudsman Office, the term of office, and its
relations with other human rights institutions must be
structured carefully.266 The independence and goodwill of the
Chief Ombudsman will remain as two vital factors in electing a
person to the office.
Moreover, the right to information, instead of existing as an
absolute constitutional right embodied in its own article, which
would allow the public to enjoy a higher degree of transparency
in government, is squeezed into Article 74.267 Constraining the
language about the right to information and petition to one
sentence, may lead to its exercise only in matters and
proceedings undertaken by government entities. In order to
provide an absolute right to information, the right to
262. See supra note 154 and accompanying text (discussing the international
standards for the Ombudsman Office and concerns about its structure as set forth in
the Package).
263. See supra note 155 and accompanying text (discussing the language of and
changes to Article 74 which set forth a four year term for the Ombudsman and
depicting the concerns regarding the term of office).
264. See supra note 155 and accompanying text (illustrating the four year term of
office for the Ombudsman which coincides with the new legislative year and therefore,
renders the independence of the Ombudsman questionable); see also supra note 186
and accompanying text (stating that Article 147 in the Package limits the Constitutional
Court membership to twelve years).
265. See supra note 155 and accompanying text (noting the revisions made in the
proposed language of Article 74 and stating that the Ombudsman Office in European
countries is independent of the Parliament, even though it works on behalf of the
Parliament).
266. See supra notes 150–53 and accompanying text (stating that the Package sets
forth an independent Ombudsman Office that is subordinate to the TBMM
Presidency).
267. See supra notes 151–52 and accompanying text (stating that the revision to
the right to information and appeal constitutes one phrase only, while there are three
paragraphs added to the revised Article 74 regarding the Ombudsman Office).
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information should be drafted in a separate article in the
Constitution.
In relation to TBMM membership, the revisions to Article
84 as stipulated in the Package generated some criticism among
those who believe that the 1982 constitutional provisions are
sufficient protection for deputies.268 There is some room for
discussion as to why the new draft permits the retaining TBMM
membership for a deputy, whose party has been banned for
being unconstitutional and whose statements and actions have
caused the closure of his party.269 Nevertheless, this amendment
is another significant step in bringing the Turkish Constitution
closer to its European counterparts, as the changes to Article 84
are in line with the conventional democratic principles of the
EU.270
Finally, the amendments to Article 166, regarding the
Planning, Economic and Social Council, lack substantive
information regarding what type of constitutional guarantee this
council is granted.271 While there are concerns regarding the use
of the Council as a tool for the government to regulate
economic and social policies, it is nonetheless a democratic
insertion to the 1982 Constitution and valuable for
strengthening social dialogue channels.272 The consolidated
version of Article 166 enables NGOs to express their views and
participate in the planning of policies.273 The amendment is a
major step toward a participatory system, in which various
segments of society, such as NGOs, professional chambers, and
government representatives, can discuss various topics and
268. See supra notes 158–59 (noting that the pre-amendment language of Article
84 is sufficient as it grants TBMM members legislative non-liability for their
statements).
269. See supra note 158 and accompanying text (noting the changes in the
language of the article).
270. See supra note 158 and accompanying text (noting that in the past, the ECHR
has repeatedly decided that the regulations in the Turkish Constitution regarding
political bans and loss of TBMM membership violate Article 3 of the Protocol No. 1 of
the Convention concerning the right to elect and be elected).
271. See supra notes 217–18 and accompanying text (discussing the Package’s
amendments to Article 166 of the 1982 Constitution).
272. See supra note 219 and accompanying text (discussing how different segments
of society can gather and consult each other within the Council).
273. See supra notes 217–19 and accompanying text (describing the importance of
organizing the Council as an independent review mechanism that promotes domestic
peace and dialog).
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contribute to the solution-finding process for economic and
social issues in Turkey.274
B. Reorganization of the Judiciary
The second part of the Package aims to reorganize the
judiciary by restructuring the composition and scope of the
HSYK and restricting the judicial power of military courts.275 The
changes can be categorized under three groups: those regarding
the Constitutional Court (Articles 16 through 19); those
concerning the HSYK (Articles 14 and 22); and those relating to
the military justice (Articles 11, 15, 20, and 21).
Articles 16 through 19 of the Package, which amend
Articles 146 through 149 of the amended 1982 Constitution,
address the changes made to the Constitutional Court. The
revisions made to Article 146, regarding the organization of the
Constitutional Court, introduce greater diversity among the
institutions from which the members of the Constitutional
Court are selected.276 The amended Article 146 also takes away
the broad appointment power of the President.277 With these
amendments, the President now has the power to appoint
fourteen of the seventeen Constitutional Court members, four
of which he will select directly from certain categories and ten of
which he will select from the list of names submitted to him.278
The presence of two military judges in the Constitutional Court,
to be appointed by the President, is questionable if the goal of
the Package is to create a more democratic structure.279

274. See supra note 219 and accompanying text (discussing how different segments
of society can gather and consult each other within the Council).
275. See supra note 141 and accompanying text (dividing the amendment package
into two categories).
276. See supra notes 178–81 and accompanying text (summarizing the revisions
made by Article 16).
277. See supra notes 178–81 and accompanying text (summarizing the revisions
made by Article 16 including the reduced appointment powers of the President). Cf.
supra note 78 and accompanying text (stating that the 1982 Constitution grants the
President broad powers).
278. See supra note 181 and accompanying text (distinguishing the requirement of
two military judges in the court as stipulated in the consolidated version of Article 146).
279. See supra notes 180–81 and accompanying text (arguing that in democratic
states political powers and parliaments, therefore civilians, play a significant role in the
election of Constitutional Court members); see also supra notes 30–32 and
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Moreover, amended Article 146 introduces a minimum age
requirement of forty-five for judges, while the changes to Article
147 propose a twelve-year term of office for members of the
Constitutional Court.280 These two changes are necessary to
ensure the constant transformation, evolution, and
modernization of the Court as well as accommodation of
change.281 Twelve years are sufficient for members to gain
experience and reflect these experiences in their work, and it is
also likely sufficient for the social developments in Turkey to be
manifested in the composition of the Court. Moreover, the
changes bring the Constitutional Court closer to the courts of
Europe, most of which have non-renewable terms of nine to
twelve years and a retirement age of seventy years.282
One peculiar change to note is the number of non-lawyers
in the Constitutional Court, which the Package raised from five
members to nine members.283 This revision increases the group
of persons who do not hold a law degree in an institution that
serves as the highest legal body of the country.
On the one hand, this composition of the Court allows for
flexibility and reflects social changes in the country.284 Overall,
the changes fall short of attaining the level of independent
judiciary set forth in the 1961 Constitution terms of an and
should be supplemented with further reforms in this branch.285
accompanying text (summarizing the history of military role in Turkish politics and
society).
280. See supra notes 182, 184 and accompanying text (providing the amended
language of Article 146 and 147 which incorporate the limitations on the term of office
and minimum age for Constitutional Court membership).
281. See supra note 184 and accompanying text (noting the twelve year limitation
for Constitutional Court memberships and arguing that this period is sufficient for a
judge to gain experience and at the same time allow the Court to reflect social changes
in its profile).
282. See supra note 184 and accompanying text (noting that in many European
courts, the term of office for judges are set to be non-renewable terms of nine to twelve
years); see also supra note 157 (stating that Article 23 of the Charter stipulates the term
of office and dismissal for judges in the ECHR).
283. See supra notes 178–81 and accompanying text (reflecting the changes made
to the organization of the Constitutional Court).
284. See supra notes 187–96 and accompanying text (discussing revisions to Article
148 of the Constitution).
285. See supra note 58 and accompanying text (noting that the 1961 Constitution
institutionalized judicial review and the complete independence of the judiciary); see
also supra note 180 (stating that the election power granted to the TBMM by the 1961
Constitution were terminated after the military coup in 1971).
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The Package introduces the right of individual recourse in
the amended language of Article 148, regarding the functions
and powers of the Constitutional Court.286 By allowing an
individual citizen to bring his case before the highest court in
the country, the Package may relieve the European Court of
Human Rights from numerous cases brought by Turkish citizens
dissatisfied with the legal remedies presented in their country.287
Another critical change in Article 148 allows the trial of
generals and commanders before the Supreme Court for
offenses related to their duties.288 These individuals are added to
the list of officials who can be tried before the Constitutional
Court acting as the Supreme Court, which in the preamendment 1982 Constitution already includes the President,
Prime Minister, members of the Council of Ministers, members,
and presidents of higher courts, members of the HSYK, and
members of the Court of Accounts.289 The consolidated version
of Article 148 no longer renders the aforementioned
commanders and the Chief of Staff subject to military courts,
thus, moving them away from the burdens of the military
hierarchy.290
The functioning and trial procedure of the Constitutional
Court is addressed in amended Article 149, which revises the
structure of the Constitutional Court according to the
amendments made in Articles 146–148 and divides the work

286. See supra note 189 and accompanying text (providing the amended language
of Article 148 regarding the right to individual application to the Constitutional
Court).
287. See supra note 189 and accompanying text (noting the additions to Article
148 that allow anyone, who claims that any of their fundamental rights and freedoms
guaranteed under the Constitution and ECHR have been violated by the public
authorities, to apply to the Constitutional Court).
288. See supra notes 191–93 and accompanying text (noting the revised language
regarding the trial of certain officials before the Constitutional Court).
289. See supra notes 191–93 and accompanying text (indicating that the
Constitutional Court shall act in its capacity as the Supreme Court when trying certain
military official for their offences related to their duties).
290. See supra notes 191–92 and accompanying text (noting the revisions to Article
148 regarding the trial of certain officials before the Constitutional Court acting as the
Supreme Court and adding that the Package fills a gap in regulation regarding the
adjudication of such cases which had been normally brought to the Military Court of
Cassation).
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between the General Assembly and the Chambers.291 While it
may seem that most of the work has been given to the General
Assembly, considering the high number of individual
applications, in contrast to the more substantive but smaller
number of closures, annulments, and appeals cases indicates
that the workload of the General Assembly will likely be
comparable to that of the Chambers. 292
Articles 14 and 22, which affect changes in Articles 144 and
159 of the amended 1982 Constitution, address the changes
made to the HSYK. The 1982 Constitution assigns the duty to
supervise and investigate the performance of judges and public
prosecutors to judiciary inspectors with the permission of the
Ministry of Justice.293 The chief supervisor of these inspectors at
the highest level is the Ministry of Justice, a structure
inconsistent with the principle of judicial independence.294 The
amended Article 144 introduces a two-fold inspection structure
by providing the HSYK with the duty of inspection of judicial
services and the administrative duties of public prosecutors and
keeping the inspection of judicial services not related to the
judicial duties in the realm of the judicial inspectors
subordinated to the Ministry of Justice.295 This structure allows
the HSYK a basis for carrying out its work without the risk of
political interference. Nevertheless, the Minister of Justice
continues to chair the council and, accordingly, the investigative
authority of the HSYK remains subject to his approval.
In addition, this revision may also result in the appointment
of judicial inspectors who are neither judges nor public
prosecutors, because the qualification to “be a judge or a
prosecutor by profession” is required only in the case of internal
auditors and a similar requirement is not stated for judicial

291. See supra note 201 and accompanying text (discussing the task sharing
stipulated in the revised version of Article 149).
292. See supra notes 197–201 and accompanying text (discussing Article 149 and
the Constitutional Courts).
293. See supra notes 165–66 and accompanying text (discussing the changes to
Article 144).
294. See supra notes 209–10 and accompanying text (noting that the dual
representation problem caused by the presidency of the Minister of Justice and the
membership of the Undersecretariat to the Minister of Justice in the HSYK).
295. See supra notes 165–66 and accompanying text (discussing the changes to
Article 144).
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inspectors.296 Aside from the background constraints, the new
draft fails to define the content, scope of authority, and requisite
qualifications of an internal auditor. If left as is, this revision
does not constitute a reform in the judiciary.
The second article regarding the HSYK, Article 159,
addresses the organization of Council. The HSYK was
established by the 1982 Constitution to admit judges and public
prosecutors into professions, appointments, transfers, and
promotions, and to impose disciplinary penalties, and the
removal of judges and prosecutors from office.297 Unfortunately,
the HSYK today constitutes a hindrance to the Turkish state of
law as it is headed by the Minister of Justice and comprised of
members, including the Undersecretary to the Minister of
Justice, the Court of Cassation, and the Council of State.298 The
removal of the Minister of Justice or at least the Undersecretary
to the Minister of Justice from the HSYK would remove the dual
representation problem and result in the highest level of
independence of the HSYK.299 Nevertheless, by increasing the
number of HSYK members, and prohibiting the Minister of
Justice from voting in the Chambers and participating in their
meetings, the new draft significantly weakens the influence of
these three institutions within the HSYK.300
Articles 11, 15, 20, and 21, which amend Articles 125, 145,
156, and 157 of the 1982 Constitution address the changes made
to the military justice system. The consolidated version of Article
125 stands in great contrast to the 1982 language of Article 125
that rules out any type of judicial review for the acts of the
296. See supra notes 165–66 and accompanying text (differentiating between the
qualifications required for internal auditors and those required for judicial inspectors
as amended in the Package).
297. See supra note 81 and accompanying text (listing the HSYK as one of the
newly established institutions under the 1982 Constitution).
298. See supra note 78 and accompanying text (noting the influence the executive
could exert in the judiciary through the structure of the HSYK according to the
original 1982 Constitution).
299. See supra notes 209–10 and accompanying text (noting that the dual
representation problem caused by the presidency of the Minister of Justice and the
membership of the Undersecretary to the Minister of Justice in the HSYK).
300. See supra notes 206–16 (noting the changes to Article 159); see also notes 209–
10 and accompanying text (noting that the presidency of the Minister of Justice in the
HSYK, while enforced in other democracies, hinders the absolute independence of the
HSYK).
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President and the decisions of YAŞ.301 Aside from these two types
of decisions, the 1982 Constitution denies judicial review of
decisions made by the HSYK, the Court of Accounts, and the
Supreme Election Board, as well those decisions made under
emergency laws and disciplinary penalties against public
servants.302 By allowing judicial review of at least some HSYK
decisions, the Package establishes an effective remedy against
such judgments, signifying a move in the direction of a more
democratic constitution. Yet, because it qualifies the decisions
that can be appealed, the Package does not achieve the
liberalism that a constitution of a state of law requires.303 In
order to provide an efficient remedy, reform of legal regulations
and military justice are necessary.
Finally, the consolidated Article 125 stipulates that judicial
power shall be limited to control of the lawfulness of
administrative actions and procedures and that under no
circumstance be used as the control of expediency.304 Judicial
bodies are not institutions that take administrative actions; but
rather they have the duty of conducting judicial review. Adding
a specific sentence regarding this established principle in the
Package is unnecessary, as it does not provide any legal
conclusions, but most likely has the purpose of suggesting that
in the past, judicial power was used as the control of
expediency.305
The original text of Article 145 regarding military justice
was the product of the 1980 Coup.306 The pre-amendment
language grants military courts extensive jurisdiction by allowing
them to hear cases of military personnel who have committed
301. See supra notes 161–62 and accompanying text (discussing the right of appeal
to certain YAŞ decisions under the amended version Article 125).
302. See supra notes 162–63 and accompanying text (noting that judicial remedies
shall be available against the decisions of the Supreme Military Council).
303. See supra notes 160–64 and accompanying text (providing proposed changes
to Article 125 regarding judicial remedies against certain decisions made by YAŞ).
304. See supra note 164 and accompanying text (stating the limitation of judicial
power of HSYK as stipulated in the consolidated version of Article 125).
305. See supra note 164 and accompanying text (discussing the addition to Article
125, which reiterates the established principle that judicial power shall “under no
circumstance be used as the control of expediency”).
306. See supra notes 78–81 and accompanying text (providing a summary of the
drafting process for the 1982 Constitution that involved almost no public participation
and heavy influence by the military).
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military offenses, regular offenses committed by military
personnel against other military personnel or in military places,
and offenses connected with military service and duties.307
Overall, the 1982 language of Article 145 creates a duality in the
justice system, under which a civilian and a military officer can
be tried in different courts.308 These courts are regulated by
different laws and, therefore, receive different sentences for the
same offense.309 The revisions to Article 145 do not eliminate
this dual mechanism, but do limit military courts’ jurisdiction in
some situations.310 Removing from the text “offenses committed
in military places” in and of itself suffices to significantly restrict
military courts’ jurisdiction under the 1982 Constitution.311
The Package limits military courts’ jurisdiction over military
offenses and stipulates that criminal offenses by military
personnel against state security, the constitutional order, or its
functioning shall be under the jurisdiction of civilian courts.312
The Package proposes equal treatment of civilian offenses
against the existing 1982 constitutional order and a military
general’s offense against the order, which in the latter case can
be identified as a coup d’état. Although the limitations imposed
on military courts’ jurisdiction are necessary democratic steps, in
view of the recent Ergenekon case, this amendment to Article 145
does not amount to a reform and remains nothing more than a
symbolic change in the Constitution.313 In order to achieve a
307. See supra notes 172–77 and accompanying text (comparing the preamendment language of Article 145 that grants military courts extensive jurisdiction
with the revised language).
308. See supra notes 172–77 and accompanying text (providing the 1982 language
of Article 145 that preserved the dual justice system for military personnel and civilians
created by earlier constitutions and amendments).
309. See supra notes 172–77 and accompanying text (discussing the effects of a
dual justice system as established by the 1982 Constitution).
310. See supra notes 172–77 and accompanying text (providing the revisions made
to Article 145).
311. See supra notes 172–75 and accompanying text (noting the changes made to
Article 145 regarding the limitations on military court’s jurisdiction); see also Part I.D
(discussing the 1982 Constitution).
312. See supra notes 172–73 and accompanying text (providing the revised
language of Article 145 which stipulates that military courts shall have jurisdiction only
in relation to military offenses committed by military personnel or related to their
military services or duties).
313. See supra notes 110 and accompanying text (discussing the Ergenekon case and
how it is viewed by the public).
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more than symbolic reform in military justice, high military
courts must be completely eliminated or at least, judicial
remedies against their decision must be enabled by the
Constitution.314
The revisions in the second paragraph, relating to offenses
of non-military persons in time of war, bring an end to the
adjudication of civilians in military court at times of martial law
as stipulated in the pre-amendment 1982 Constitution.315 Under
martial law, fundamental rights are withheld, certain powers are
shifted from civilian bureaucracy to military bureaucracy, and
offenses in relation to the factors that led to the declaration of
martial law are handled by martial law military courts.316 The
Package reduces martial law by closing the door to military trials
for civilian offenders.317 By removing the final phrase from
Article 145 regarding the protection of military judges and the
office of commander in relation to the requirements of military
service, the Package leaves the issues of military ranking, such as
promotion and progress of ranks, ambiguous, as they are not set
forth in the text.318 In sum, the changes proposed in the new
draft of Article 145 prove to be insufficient in establishing a truly
democratic state of law.
The changes introduced in the revised Article 156
regarding the Military Court of Cassation, are carried out to
harmonize the language of this article with that of revised
Article 145, concerning the organization of Military Justice.319
314. See supra note 171 (stating that the existence of a military justice system is
problematic in terms of human rights and democracy and that, in constitutional states,
civilians cannot be heard in military courts and military court decisions must be
reviewed by civilian high courts).
315. See supra notes 172–77 and accompanying text (illustrating the changes made
to the second paragraph of Article 145 regarding offenses of non-military persons at
times of war).
316. See supra notes 172–77 and accompanying text (reflecting the revisions in the
second paragraph of Article 145 regarding offenses and persons falling within the
jurisdiction of military courts in time of war).
317. See supra notes 172–77 and accompanying text (illustrating the amendments
in the second paragraph of Article 145 regarding persons and offenses falling within
the jurisdiction of military courts in time of war).
318. See supra notes 172–77 and accompanying text (illustrating the changes made
to the second paragraph of Article 145 regarding offenses of non-military persons at
times of war).
319. See supra notes 172–77, 202–03 and accompanying text (providing the
revisions made to Articles 145 and 156 in the Package).
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The revisions made to these two articles intend to fulfill the
same objective of strengthening the independence and
impartiality of the judiciary.320
Serving the same purpose as the changes made to Article
156, the revisions to Article 157, concerning the High Military
Administrative Court of Appeals, aim to harmonize the language
with Article 145 regarding Military Justice.321 In this case, the
revisions apply to the functioning of the High Military
Administrative Court.322 This change does not carry any
reforming value because it does not introduce a change in the
court system that was established under the 1982 Constitution.323
The Package could have taken a further step by abolishing the
High Military Administrative Court and transferring its duties to
a civilian counterpart.324
The revisions to articles analyzed in Part A of this Section
regarding human rights issues, and the articles analyzed in Part
B regarding the organization of the judiciary, the HSYK, and the
military justice system, constitute common goals for the AKP and
the EU.325 As such, EU representatives welcomed the 2010
referendum results as a step toward the modernization of the
state in line with Western principles.326 At the same time, the
political pasts of the AKP deputies and the motivations of the
political forerunners of the party have raised eyebrows not only
320. See supra notes 172–77, 202–03 and accompanying text (depicting the
changes made to Article 145 and 156 regarding the military justice and the Military
Court of Cassation).
321. See supra notes 202–05 and accompanying text (illustrating the amendments
in the revised language of Article 156 and 157 that contain changes to the organization
and functioning of military high courts).
322. See supra notes 186–87 and accompanying text (illustrating the revisions in
the Package regarding the High Military Administrative Court).
323. See supra notes 179–80 (discussing Article 156 in the1982 Constitution prior
to the Package); see also Part I.D (summarizing the drafting process of the 1982
Constitution and changes it introduced).
324. See supra notes 171 and 313 (stating in constitutional states, civilians cannot
be heard in military courts and military court decisions must be reviewed by civilian
high courts). In order to achieve this standard in Turkey, high military courts must be
eliminated or, at the minimum, their decisions must be reviewed by civilian high
courts. See supra notes 171 and 313.
325. See supra notes 123–26 and accompanying text (discussing the commonality
between the reforms necessary for the EU membership and those implemented by the
AKP).
326. See supra notes 241–49 (reflecting the statements by foreign media and
politicians, some of which were EU representatives).
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among EU officials but also among Turkish citizens, precisely
forty-two percent of the electorate as measured on September
12, 2010.327
The Package as a whole introduces changes that are
necessary in a constitutional state. While the improvement of
human rights issues such as the equality of citizens before the
law and the protection of the privacy are noteworthy
developments, many revisions proposed in the Package fail to
fully carry out the reforms to an extent necessary to identify
them as part of a truly reformist approach.328 This Package
contains shortcomings and is certainly not expected to solve all
of the issues in the Turkish Constitution, but it paves the way for
a new, civil, and democratic Constitution in the future.329 The
revisions in the Package remove many of the barriers in front of
Turkey’s democratization and the guarantee of constitutional
rights and freedoms for all.330 Nevertheless, democratic
standards need to be taken into account in the AKP’s attempt to
implement the Package and later during the drafting process of
a new Constitution in order to ensure an open, transparent, and
inclusive process.331
Finally, attention must be paid to the unique political and
social picture Turkey portrays. Although general consensus
deems military influence in politics and society a serious
impediment to the development of democracy, Turkey presents
a unique case based on a complex history that dates back to the
327. See supra notes 220–22 and accompanying text (indicating the referendum
results, with fifty-eight percent approval of the referendum and noting the skepticism
stated by some Turks).
328. See supra notes 248–74 and accompanying text (analyzing the revisions made
to the Constitution that broadened fundamental rights and freedoms); see, e.g., supra
notes 301–02 and accompanying text (noting that the restriction placed on the type of
YAŞ, HSYK, and Court of Accountsdecisions that can be appealed is a setback to
achieving a more democratic Constitution).
329. See supra notes 133–35 and 139–40 and accompanying text (detailing the
AKP’s efforts to draft a new constitution in 2007).
330. See supra notes 248–74 and accompanying text (analyzing the revision made
to the 1982 Constitution that expand fundamental rights and freedoms); see, e.g., supra
note 285 and accompanying text (listing the articles that amend the organization of the
judiciary and therefore eliminate many of the provisions implemented by military
coups).
331. See supra notes 67, 79 and accompanying text (noting that both the 1971
amendments to the 1961 Constitution and the drafting process of the 1982
Constitution were completed with almost no public participation).
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transition from the Ottoman Empire to the modern Turkish
nation-state; Turkish Armed Forces have, for decades,
constituted a critical part of the checks-and-balances system
thereby trying to maintain the society and legal system based on
secular Western foundations. In the context of this unique
structure, the weakening of the military’s central role in Turkish
politics and society may cause some instability in the country, or
at least significant and unprecedented changes in the
fundamental defining principles of the modern republic. It is in
this context that the 2010 constitutional amendment reform
package and the September 12, 2010, referendum results must
be evaluated.
CONCLUSION
Ever since the founding of the Turkish Republic, the
military, high-level diplomats, judges, and academics have
exercised nearly absolute power in shaping Turkish domestic
and foreign policy. Empowered as the guards of Kemalist
ideology and further supported by military-drafted constitutions,
the Turkish military has historically carried on a supervisory role
by pressuring the government during different periods to
execute the policies of its own design. The rise of the AKP
government is significant in this regard as it seeks to limit the
traditional role held by the military and to expand the influence
of the judiciary through constitutional reform, specifically
through the amendment of twenty-six constitutional articles.
Given that the majority of the Turkish public increasingly
supports the AKP’s policies, as is evident in the last two general
elections, it is very likely that the AKP will continue to succeed in
its constitutional reform efforts with the goal of democratizing
Turkish politics and accelerating Turkey’s EU membership
process.
Note: The commentary provided in this work on
constitutional reform in Turkey is up-to-date as of early June
2011. Since the completion of this Comment, the AKP has
achieved its third consecutive victory in the general elections on
June 12, 2011 and has become the first political party in the era
of Turkish democracy to increase its margin of votes in three
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consecutive elections.332 According to many Turks, under the
AKP regime Turkey is witnessing its most politically and
economically stable periods since its founding.333 This success,
however, did not suffice for the AKP to amend the constitution
alone as the party won 326 seats in the parliament, four seats
short of the number necessary for the AKP to implement
constitutional changes on its own.334 Instead of a second
amendment package, in this new term, the AKP hopes to draft a
completely new Turkish Constitution.335 In addition to the
Constitution, the AKP has also begun to revise the Turkish
Armed Forces Internal Service Code, which served as a legal
cover for the military in the 1980 Intervention.336 According to
this change, Article 35 of the Code will continue to provide the
332. See Erdogan’s Hat-Trick, ECONOMIST, June 13, 2011 (“The country’s
charismatic prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, becomes the first Turkish leader
not only to win three consecutive elections, but to increase his party’s share of the vote
each time.”). The votes the AKP received were: thirty-four percent in 2002, forty-seven
percent in 2007, and fifty percent in 2011. Id.; see also Erdogan 1, Ataturk 0, supra note
105 (“[P]olling shows that more than half of the 50 percent of Turks . . . cast their
votes for the piously Islamic ruling Freedom and Justice Party (AKP) last month . . . .”).
333. See Simon Cameron-Moore & Daren Butler, Special Report: Erdogan: The
Strongest Man in Turkey, REUTERS (Aug. 8, 2011, 12:30 PM), http://www.reuters.com/
article/2011/08/08/us-turkey-erdogan-idUSTRE7773X420110808 (“Over the past
decade, [Erdogan has] transformed Turkey from a basket case dependent on IMF
loans to the 16th largest economy in the world. He wants Turkey to be in the top 10 by
2023.”); see also Profile: Recep Tayyip Erdogan, AL JAZEERA, May 27, 2011 (“[Erdogan’s]
popularity has been boosted further by Turkey’s near-decade of economic and political
stability under AKP stewardship.”).
334. See supra note 137 and accompanying text (providing that the minimum
number of votes necessary to make constitutional changes is 330 votes); see also Turkey
Ruling Party Wins Election with Reduced Majority, BBC NEWS, June 12, 2011 (“AKP had 50% of the
vote, which . . . translated to 326 seats in parliament.”).
335. See Cameron-Moore & Butler, supra note 332 (“Erdogan has been very open
about his plans for a new constitution that could open the way for him to become
president.”); see also Erdogan to Work with Others on Turkish Constitution, EURONEWS
(June 13, 2011, 10:25), http://www.euronews.net/2011/06/13/erdogan-to-work-withothers-on-constitution/ (quoting Erdoğan as saying: “We will write a civilian, free
constitution which brings all parts of society together. Everyone will find themselves in
this constitution, east will be represented, west will be represented.”).
336. See Law No. 211 of Jan. 4, 1961, Resmi Gazete [R.G.] No. 10703 (Jan. 10,
1961) (Turk.); see also Abdülhamit Bilici, Gul Urges Change to Article 35 of TSK Internal
Service Code, TODAY’S ZAMAN (Apr. 28, 2011), http://www.todayszaman.com/news242310-gul-urges-change-to-article-35-of-tsk-internal-service-code.html (“In order to
fully put a stop to attempts by the military to interfere in politics, President Abdullah
Gül has made a call for change to Article 35 of the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK)
Internal Service Code, which is believed to be the main reason behind the military’s
readiness to stage coups d’état.”).
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military with the duty to protect the Turkish Republic, but in the
new language of the Code, this duty will now adhere to the
parliamentary system, bringing Turkish politics a step closer to
liberal democracy.337

337. See Law No. 211, art. 35 (stating the responsibility of the army to safeguard
Turkish territory and the Turkish Republic); see also Işık, supra note 82 (noting the
prospective amendments to Article 35 of the Code, which served General Evren as his
legal reasoning for the 1982 Coup).

